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Real Women, Real Rape
I. Bennett Capers
AbstRAct
There are several reasons to find rape shield laws troubling.  From the point of view of 
many defense lawyers and civil libertarians, rape shield laws, by curtailing a defendant’s 
ability to offer evidence of an accuser’s prior sexual conduct, unfairly circumscribe a 
defendant’s right to confront witnesses and present relevant evidence in his defense.  By 
contrast, rape shield proponents argue that rape shield laws are too weak and are so 
riddled with exceptions that they amount to little more than sieves.  This Article calls 
attention to two other problems with rape shield laws—problems that can be traced 
to the very enactment of rape shield laws but that for the most part have remained 
hidden, unnoticed, and unremarked on.  The first problem concerns the expressive 
message implicitly communicated by rape shield laws: that jurors should assume the 
complainant is a virgin, or at least notionally a good girl, and thus deserving of the law’s 
protection.  Because of rape shield laws, any suggestion that women may lead healthy 
sexual lives is quietly pushed to the side and corseted.  In short, the concern is that in 
pushing for rape shield laws feminists, victim rights advocates, and prosecutors have 
reinscribed the very chastity requirement they hoped to abolish.  The second problem 
is what I term expressive message failure, which occurs when a rape shield’s message 
conflicts with preexisting rape scripts: those assumptions we have about what rapists 
look like, what constitutes rape, and most importantly here, what rape victims look 
like.  The Article sketches out solutions to these specific problems and gestures toward 
a broader solution to tackle other flaws with rape shield laws.
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INTRODUCTION 
There are several reasons to find rape shield laws troubling.  From the 
point of view of many defense attorneys and civil libertarians, rape shield laws, 
by curtailing a defendant’s ability to offer evidence of a victim’s prior sexual 
conduct, unfairly circumscribe a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to con-
front witnesses and present relevant evidence in his defense.1  To make matters 
worse, many jurisdictions have now coupled rape shield laws with what amounts 
to rape sword laws—laws that specifically allow the prosecution to introduce 
evidence of a defendant’s sexual history as proof of his2 character or propensity.3  
Defense attorneys and civil libertarians would argue that these rules not only tip 
the scales against innocence.  They also frustrate the truth-finding process, un-
dermine the notion of innocent until proven guilty, and result in miscarriages of 
justice. 
For entirely different reasons, rape shield proponents have also found rape 
shield laws wanting.  Despite the best intentions of feminist scholars, victim 
rights advocates, and prosecutors, rape shield laws have failed to protect the pri-
vacy of women, put an end to what historically amounted to a chastity 
requirement, and level the playing field at trial.4  From their perspective, the 
rape shield laws are so riddled with exceptions that they amount to sieves.5 
  
1. See, e.g., David S. Rudstein, Rape Shield Laws: Some Constitutional Problems, 18 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1, 14–46 (1976); J. Alexander Tanford & Anthony J. Bocchino, Rape Victim Shield Laws and the Sixth 
Amendment, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 544 (1980); see also Frederick Eisenbud, Note, Limitations on the 
Right to Introduce Evidence Pertaining to the Prior Sexual History of the Complaining Witness in Cases of 
Forcible Rape: Reflection of Reality or Denial of Due Process?, 3 HOFSTRA L. REV. 403, 419–25 (1975). 
2. This Article focuses, at least initially, on cases involving male defendants and female complainants.  This 
is not to suggest that male-on-male rape is not significant.  As I have argued elsewhere, once we include 
prison populations, the frequency of male victim rape is staggering and deserves much more attention.  See 
Bennett Capers, Real Rape Too, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1259 (2011).  Female perpetrator–male victim rape is 
also a problem.  In fact, a significant portion of child sexual abuse victims identify their abusers as female.  
Moreover, as the recent prosecution of female officer Lynndie England in connection with abuse at 
Abu Ghraib should make clear, women are not above sexually abusing adult men.  For a discussion of 
female perpetrator–male victim rape, see the chapter “Female Perpetrators; Male Victims” in Joanna 
Bourke’s Rape.  JOANNA BOURKE, RAPE: SEX, VIOLENCE, HISTORY 204–37 (2007). 
3. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 413. 
4. See, e.g., BOURKE, supra note 2, at 404 (“Rape shield laws are a good example of a reform that has 
had less impact in practice than hoped.”); David P. Bryden & Sonja Lengnick, Rape in the Criminal 
Justice System, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1194, 1199 (1997) (concluding that rape law reforms 
have “generally had little or no effect on the outcomes of rape cases”); see also Rosemary C. Hunter, 
Gender in Evidence: Masculine Norms vs. Feminist Reforms, 19 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 127, 134 
(1996) (observing that rape shield laws “have been notably unsuccessful in achieving their aims”). 
5. Rape shield laws have been applied haphazardly and incoherently.  As Michelle Anderson observed 
a decade ago, “Cases managed to slip past rape shields when they involved women previously in-
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Nearly thirty-five years after passage of the federal rape shield law and a 
host of state cognates, these problems alone should be enough to raise questions 
about the continuing viability of rape shield laws.  This Article calls attention to 
two other problems.  Though the issues raised here can be traced to the very 
enactment of rape shield laws, for the most part they have remained hidden, 
unnoticed, and unremarked on.  The first problem concerns the expressive mes-
sage communicated by rape shield laws.  Though rarely made explicit, the 
message to jurors sitting on rape trials is that they should assume that the 
complainant is a virgin, or if not a virgin, at least notionally a good girl, and thus 
deserving of the law’s protection.  Because of our rape shield laws, any sug-
gestion that women may lead healthy sexual lives is quietly pushed to the side 
and corseted.  More problematic, any suggestion that all women deserve the law’s 
protection, including women who are sexually active, is suppressed.  Instead, 
women are conscripted as idealized women—as cardboard cutout women—
chaste and pure and simple.  As such, the first problem is not that rape shields 
do not work.  The first problem is the effects that attend rape shields when they 
succeed.6 
The second problem with rape shield laws stems from the first but, because 
it results from what I call expressive message failure, tugs in a different direction.  
While the normative message of rape shield laws is that rape victims are good 
girls and thus deserving of the law’s protection, this message can fail if it conflicts 
with preexisting rape scripts: those assumptions we hold about what rapists look 
like, what constitutes rape, and most important here, what rape victims look like.  
If the supposedly ideal rapist remains a male stranger who jumps out of the 
bushes, preferably black and wielding a knife,7 there is also a supposedly ideal 
  
timate with the defendant, women who frequented bars to attract new sexual partners, prostitutes, 
or other women deemed similarly promiscuous.”  Michelle J. Anderson, From Chastity Requirement 
to Sexuality License: Sexual Consent and a New Rape Shield Law, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 51, 55 
(2002).  Beyond these problems, rape remains perhaps the most underreported crime, and conviction 
rates, whether by plea or following trial, remain abysmally low.  See Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 
4, at 1210, 1220. 
6. While rape shield rules, because of their exceptions, have proved more porous than their sponsors 
initially expected, this is not to suggest that the shield never applies.  More to the point, studies show 
that when shields are applied, they have been extremely effective at excluding evidence of a complainant’s 
sexual history.  See CASSIA SPOHN & JULIE HORNEY, RAPE LAW REFORM: A GRASSROOTS 
REVOLUTION AND ITS IMPACT 129–30 (1992). 
7. See, e.g., Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 600 
(1990); Dorothy E. Roberts, Rape, Violence, and Women’s Autonomy, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 359, 
365 (1993); see also I. Bennett Capers, The Unintentional Rapist, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 1345 (2010); 
Samuel H. Pillsbury, Crimes Against the Heart: Recognizing the Wrongs of Forced Sex, 35 LOY. L.A. L. 
REV. 845, 865 (2002) (“The traditional paradigm of rape remains that of the stranger attack, of a 
830 60 UCLA L. REV. 826 (2013) 
 
rape victim: young, attractive, white, female, and chaste.8  In practice, this means 
that while some women might ostensibly benefit9 from rape shield law’s expres-
sive message, this advantage does not extend to other women who, because of 
race or class or some other trait, do not fit the ideal victim script.  In these cases, 
when a rape shield law conceals evidence of a complainant’s sexual history, jurors 
may fall back on default assumptions diametrically at odds with the rape shield 
law’s expressive message.  In short, if the question is, “Are rape shields good for 
all women?” the answer seems to be a resounding no. 
This Article’s argument is unconventional, to be sure.  Feminist legal schol-
ars writing about rape tend to argue that rape shields need to be strengthened 
and loopholes closed.10  Michelle Anderson argues that the rape shield excep-
tion for prior sexual activity between the accuser and the accused should be elim-
inated.11  In a similar vein, Deborah Tuerkheimer is critical of the exception that 
many courts allow for so-called pattern evidence, which permits defendants to 
introduce evidence of a complainant’s sexual history in cases in which that history 
suggests a pattern of promiscuous behavior.12  These suggestions are not wrong 
by any means.  But they do fall short, if only for the reason that they sidestep the 
more fundamental question about whether rape shields are good for women in 
the first place.  They certainly sidestep the issue of how rape shields might affect 
real women. 
This Article proceeds as follows.  Part I provides a brief overview of rape 
law and the evidentiary rules that worked in tandem with rape law prior to the 
  
man lurking in the dark . . . who grabs an unsuspecting female, takes her to a remote location, 
and violently attacks her . . . .”). 
8. See, e.g., Capers, supra note 2, at 1306; Aya Gruber, Rape, Feminism, and the War on Crime, 84 
WASH. L. REV. 581, 587 (2009) (“[T]he law [in the late-nineteenth to early-twentieth century] 
required ‘true’ victims to be ultimately innocent ladies who would rather fight to the death than 
give up their virginity.”); Aviva Orenstein, Special Issues Raised by Rape Trials, 76 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1585, 1587 (2007) (“Traditionally, successful rape allegations involved a virtuous, ideally 
virginal woman, who is attacked by a creepy stranger.”); cf. Nils Christie, The Ideal Victim, in FROM 
CRIME POLICY TO VICTIM POLICY: REORIENTING THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 17 (Ezzat A. 
Fattah ed., 1986). 
9. Of course, any supposed benefit is not cost free.  The cost to the complainant is that she must 
adhere to a gendered, good-girl script to secure a conviction.  The cost to women in general is the 
continued privileging of modesty. 
10. See, e.g., Cassia Spohn & Julie Horney, “The Law’s the Law, but Fair Is Fair:” Rape Shield Laws 
and Officials’ Assessments of Sexual History Evidence, 29 CRIMINOLOGY 137, 156 (1991) (surveying 
an array of shields and noting the “importance of passing strong rape shield laws if victims are to 
be afforded any protection”). 
11. Anderson, supra note 5, at 118–30; see also Michelle J. Anderson, Time to Reform Rape Shield 
Laws: Kobe Bryant Case Highlights Holes in the Armor, CRIM. JUST., Summer 2004, at 14. 
12. Deborah Tuerkheimer, Judging Sex, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1461 (2012). 
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1970s to impose, in effect, a “chastity requirement.”13  To enforce this require-
ment, courts allowed defendants to cross-examine a rape complainant about her 
prior sexual history, to introduce testimony about her reputation for chastity, and 
in some cases, to prove her sexual history by calling her prior sexual partners as 
witnesses.  In fact, these rules functioned as a juridical finger on the scale, tip-
ping the scale toward innocence.  Part I then traces the agitation for change 
that began in the 1970s and set the stage for the widespread enactment of rape 
shield laws. 
Part II examines the most well-known rape shield law, Federal Rule of 
Evidence 412.14  Part II also examines Federal Rule of Evidence 413, a rape sword 
rule, which further shifts the balance in rape cases by expressly permitting evi-
dence of a defendant’s sexual history.  Part II then turns to several cases that illu-
strate how Rules 412 and 413, and their state cognates,15 operate in practice to 
cast complainants as invariably good and to cast defendants as intrinsically and 
indelibly bad. 
This turn of events—from the framing of trials as pitting bad women against 
good men, to the current framing of trials as pitting good women against bad 
men—is the subject of Part III.  This turn is bad not only for defendants 
accused of rape.  It is also bad for most rape victims and for the very law of rape 
itself.16  As rape scholars have observed, the success of rape prosecutions often 
  
13. Anderson, supra note 5, passim. 
14. Although federal courts have jurisdiction over only a small fraction of rape cases, this Article 
focuses on the federal rule for two reasons.  First, it is the most well-known rape shield rule.  
Second, its basic parameters share similarities with state rape shield rules.  Indeed, all rape shield 
rules share Rule 412’s basic assumption that a rape complainant’s sexual history is generally 
irrelevant and unduly prejudicial in determining whether a defendant is guilty or not guilty.  See 
Harriett R. Galvin, Shielding Rape Victims in the State and Federal Courts: A Proposal for the Second 
Decade, 70 MINN. L. REV. 763, 773 (1986) (observing that state rape shield statutes, 
notwithstanding their variety in scope and procedural detail, share as a “single common feature . . . 
a rejection of the previous automatic admissibility of proof of unchastity”). 
15. Every state now has some version of a rape shield.  By contrast, only a handful of states have 
cognates to Rule 413, the rape sword.  See ALASKA R. EVID. 404(b)(2)–(3); ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 13-1420 (2010); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-42-103 (2011); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1108 
(West 2009); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/115-7.3 (West Supp. 2012); LA. CODE EVID. 
ANN. art. 412.2 (2006). 
16. To be clear, I do not mean to suggest that rape shields made things worse.  My point is that rape 
shields came with very real costs, and the consequences are far more complex than a simple deter-
mination of “better” or “worse.”  What is clear is this: Rather than subverting the chastity require-
ment, rape shields reinforced it.  Rather than benefiting all victims, rape shields primarily 
benefited women who, but for their sexual history, already fit the ideal-victim script.  Rather than 
benefiting all women, or real women, rape shields further entrenched a hierarchy of women.  
Rather than protecting all women, rape shields merely moved the virtual dividing line between 
good women and bad women, allowing more women, through the concealment of their sexual 
activity, to appear on the good women side of the divide. 
832 60 UCLA L. REV. 826 (2013) 
 
depends on how closely an alleged rape hews to certain accepted rape narratives.  
While in theory rape shield rules facilitate these narratives for all women, in fact 
only a fraction of women likely benefit.  Moreover, rape shield rules facilitate 
these narratives at the cost of reinscribing a type of chastity requirement that 
harms all women. 
The Article concludes, in Part IV, by suggesting reforms that would miti-
gate the pitfalls of our current rape shield and rape sword rules while also calling 
for a wholesale reexamination of those rules.  I conclude with some reflections 
on the dismissal of the recent high-profile sexual assault case against the former 
head of the International Monetary Fund, Dominique Strauss-Kahn. 
Ultimately, my argument has implications that extend beyond rape shield 
rules to criminal law and evidentiary rules in general, and to the broader fem-
inist agenda of reform.  For starters, it calls into question the advisability of 
creating evidentiary rules that are specific to rape and sexual assault cases.17  Just 
consider: No other crime has its own set of evidentiary rules.  Of course, many 
feminists would argue that such rules are necessary because “rape is different,”18 
but that argument, standing alone, cannot possibly justify different rules.  To be 
sure, rape is different, but so is terrorism, so is espionage, so is blackmail, so is 
insider trading, and so is jaywalking.  More to the point, to create special rules 
for rape reifies gender inequality rather than combating it. 
But that is a larger argument.  For now, in this Article, my immediate con-
tention is that rape shield laws are bad for women.  Although they may appear 
to benefit all women, in fact they benefit only some—women who because of 
age and race and class can easily pass as chaste and worthy of the law’s pro-
tections.19  But beyond this is another more fundamental problem: When rape 
shields do work, they do so at extraordinary cost, reinscribing the very chastity 
requirement that they were intended to abolish. 
  
17. In fact, special rules have always existed for rape cases.  The common law applied a certain set of 
rules in rape cases to benefit certain men, some of which were codified in the original Federal 
Rules of Evidence in 1975.  See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2).  The rape shield and rape sword 
rules, in turn, were created to benefit women.  While the effect of rules has changed, what has 
been consistent is the existence of special rules.  For a critique of the notion that rape victims need 
a special legal regime, see Tracey A. Berry, Prior Untruthful Allegations Under Wisconsin’s Rape 
Shield Law: Will Those Words Come Back to Haunt You?, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 1237. 
18. E.g., Vivian Berger, Man’s Trial, Woman’s Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1, 7–10 (1977) (discussing how rape is “different”). 
19. To a large extent, this argument dovetails the work of feminist theorists who have noted that re-
forms undertaken to benefit all women sometimes reflect only the experience of white, middle-
class women and ignore intersections of race, class, and gender.  See, e.g., ELIZABETH V. SPELMAN, 
INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION IN FEMINIST THOUGHT (1988); Patricia 
A. Cain, Feminist Jurisprudence: Grounding the Theories, 4 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 191 (1989); 
Harris, supra note 7. 
Real Women, Real Rape 833 
 
 
Allow me to put this differently.  When I began this project, what imme-
diately stood out was that rape shield laws have not equally benefited black and 
Hispanic and Asian women, and in fact may leave them in a worse position than 
they would be without rape shield laws.  The more I considered the impact of rape 
shield laws, the more it became obvious that rape shield laws are bad for all 
rape victims.  And they are bad for the rest of us, too. 
I. BEFORE THE REVOLUTION 
To fully understand the story of the law of rape in this country, one must 
understand not only the black letter law of rape (which, prior to the 1970s, was 
deceptively simple) and its application (which, prior to the 1970s, was anything 
but simple).  One must also understand how evidentiary rules worked in tandem 
with the law of rape to tilt the scales against complainants, casting complainants 
as bad women and defendants as good men, at least in intraracial rape cases.20  
This Part accordingly begins with an overview of the black letter law of rape, 
and the evidentiary rules that worked in tandem with that law, prior to the ad-
vent of rape shield laws in the 1970s.  It then describes the agitation for change 
that led to the widespread passage of rape shield laws. 
A. Bad Women, Good Men 
The black letter law of rape has always been deceptively simple.21  At English 
common law, rape was defined as “carnal knowledge of a woman forcibly and 
against her will,”22 and included three basic elements: vaginal intercourse, force, 
and nonconsent.23  American jurisdictions adopted these basic elements, and 
even today, most rape statutes have these elements as their foundation.24 
But even this early substantive law—at least as interpreted by courts at the 
time—weighed in favor of defendants.  Courts interpreted the force element as 
requiring more than just proof that the defendant used force to obtain sex.  
  
20. As Anderson has observed, rape jurisprudence in the nineteenth century reflected two major goals: 
“to continue to protect white female chastity when a rape complainant embodied it; otherwise, to 
protect men from false accusers.”  Anderson, supra note 5, at 69 (footnote omitted).  The scales 
were, of course, tipped the other way in cases in which the defendant was black, and the com-
plainant white.  See generally Capers, supra note 7. 
21. Although the definition of rape has been relatively simple, the definition “really explains very 
little.”  JOHN KAPLAN ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 897 (5th ed. 2004). 
22. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *210. 
23. See SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS 
PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS 318 (7th ed. 2001). 
24. Id. 
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Courts also required proof that the complainant responded to his force with force 
of her own.  As such, rape was one of the few crimes for which the actions of the 
defendant alone were insufficient to satisfy the elements of the crime.  His force 
might render him guilty of assault or battery, but it would not render him guilty 
of rape unless there was also a specified reaction from the victim: utmost resist-
ance.25  Both the quantity and the quality of her response were put on trial, de-
liberated over, and adjudicated.  Indeed, proof of her response was necessary for 
two elements: to prove that the defendant’s force was really force and to prove 
that the victim’s nonconsent, no matter how many times expressed verbally, was 
really nonconsent.26  As one court put it, “Not only must there be entire absence 
of mental consent or assent, but there must be the most vehement exercise of 
every physical means or faculty within the woman’s power to resist the pene-
tration of her person, and this must be shown to persist until the offense is 
consummated.”27  Or as another court put it in explaining the utmost resistance 
requirement, “[I]f a woman, aware that it will be done unless she does resist, 
does not resist to the extent of her ability on the occasion, must it not be that 
she is not entirely reluctant?”28  In short, early rape law allowed men something 
akin to a “woman’s failure of actus reus defense.”29 
While courts viewed this resistance requirement as necessary to determine 
whether, in fact, a forcible rape had occurred, something else was also at stake.  
Although never stated as such, at least not explicitly, the resistance requirement 
also served a gatekeeping function: It distinguished supposedly good women 
from supposedly bad women.  The assumption, after all, was that since rape was 
a fate worse than death,30 good women would “follow the natural instinct of every 
proud female”31 to physically resist her attacker “until exhausted or overpow-
ered”32 or, as another court put it, “resist[] the attack in every way possible . . . 
  
25. See KAPLAN ET AL., supra note 21, at 904. 
26. Throughout the nineteenth century, many scholars believed that a resisting woman could not be 
raped by a single man, or as it was often put colloquially, that it was “impossible to sheath a 
sword into a vibrating scabbard.”  BOURKE, supra note 2, at 24.  These beliefs persisted 
throughout the twentieth century, though they appeared less frequently.  For a discussion of 
these beliefs, see id. at 24–28. 
27. Brown v. State, 106 N.W. 536, 538 (Wis. 1906). 
28. People v. Dohring, 59 N.Y. 374, 384 (1874). 
29. Anne M. Coughlin, Sex and Guilt, 84 VA. L. REV. 1, 36 (1998). 
30. See, e.g., Corey Rayburn, Better Dead Than R(ap)ed?: The Patriarchal Rhetoric Driving Capital 
Rape Statutes, 78 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1119 (2004). 
31. State v. Rusk, 424 A.2d 720, 733 (Md. 1981) (Cole, J., dissenting). 
32. Dohring, 59 N.Y. at 386. 
Real Women, Real Rape 835 
 
 
until she was overcome by force, was insensible through fright, or ceased 
resistance from exhaustion, fear of death or great bodily harm.”33 
But it was not just the substantive elements, and the way courts in-
terpreted them, that tipped the scales in favor of defendants.  It was also evi-
dentiary rules that courts applied.34  Several states penalized women who did 
not complain promptly and required independent corroboration of a com-
plainant’s account.35  Indeed, the prompt complaint and independent corrob-
oration requirements were viewed as so necessary for protecting defendants 
against unfounded accusations that the drafters of the Model Penal Code, con-
sidered quite progressive at the time,36 included both requirements in their sex-
ual assault provisions.37 
Most importantly, the common law allowed defendants to cross-examine 
a complainant about her sexual history, to introduce testimony regarding the com-
plainant’s reputation for chastity, and in some cases, even to call a complainant’s 
prior sexual partners as witnesses.38  In effect, these common law evidentiary rules 
allowed defendants to turn the tables.  No longer was the defendant the only one 
on trial.  Also on trial was the complainant, to determine whether she was the 
type of woman who consents, the type of woman to lie about it, and hence the type 
of woman who should not be protected by the law,39 at least not at the expense of 
a presumptively good man.  These rules, which harken back to Biblical distinc-
tions between the rape of a virgin and the rape of a nonvirgin, served to put the 
complainant on trial.40 
  
33. King v. State, 357 S.W.2d 42, 45 (Tenn. 1962). 
34. See Hunter, supra note 4, at 155 (“[P]olicymakers and judges developed special evidentiary rules, 
such as corroboration requirements, cautionary instructions, and the prompt complaint doctrine, 
to guard against the possibility that an innocent man would be convicted on the word of a vin-
dictive, lying woman.” (footnote omitted)); see also LISA M. CUKLANZ, RAPE ON TRIAL: HOW 
THE MASS MEDIA CONSTRUCT LEGAL REFORM AND SOCIAL CHANGE 18 (1996) 
(“Although the defendant was presumed innocent until proven guilty, the victim’s claim was 
under suspicion until she was proven to have the narrowly defined characteristics of chastity and 
virtue that could then establish her as a ‘legitimate victim’ of rape.”). 
35. See generally Note, The Rape Corroboration Requirement: Repeal Not Reform, 81 YALE L.J. 1365 
(1972). 
36. See MARKUS D. DUBBER, CRIMINAL LAW: MODEL PENAL CODE 6–22 (2002). 
37. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6(4)–(5) (1985). 
38. See Anderson, supra note 5, at 69. 
39. Although the cases framed the issue as one of legal relevance—to the existence of consent and to 
the issue of veracity—the normative message was clear.  As Michelle Anderson put it, “Women 
heard the rules: If you want the criminal law to vindicate you if you are raped, you better have led 
an unsullied sexual life.”  Id. at 54. 
40. Deuteronomy, for example, treats the rape of a virgin as a civil offense allowing recompense to 
the virgin’s father.  No such penalty accompanies rape of a nonvirgin.  See Deuteronomy 22:23–
29.  For more on the Judeo-Christian origins of the chastity requirement in American rape law, 
see Anderson, supra note 5, at 61–69. 
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The stated rationale for allowing evidence of a complainant’s sexual history 
was twofold.  One, courts allowed such evidence on the theory that a woman 
who had consented to sex once possessed a “character for unchastity”41 and thus 
was more likely to have consented to sex on the occasion in question.42  Put dif-
ferently, prior sexual activity was probative of consent.43  In fact, not only was 
she more likely to consent again, but she was more likely to have consented with 
the defendant, notwithstanding her claim to the contrary.  As an oft-cited early-
nineteenth-century case put it, 
In [a rape] case the material issue is on the willingness or reluctance 
of the prosecutrix . . . . [N]o court can overrule the law of human na-
ture, which declares that one who has already started on the road of 
prostitution, would be less reluctant to pursue her way, than another 
who yet remains at her home of innocence, and looks upon such a 
[pursuit] with horror. . . . [W]ill you not more readily infer assent in 
the practised Messalina, in loose attire, than in the reserved and vir-
tuous Lucretia?44 
Though other cases were less colorful in their language, their reasoning was the 
same.  For example, in State v. Johnson,45 the court stated, “In determining [the 
question of consent], . . . it is important to ascertain whether her consent would, 
from her previous habits, be the natural result of her mind, or whether it would 
be inconsistent with her previous life, and repugnant to all her moral feelings.”46  
The court in People v. Johnson47 offered a similar justification:  
  
41. 3 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE 
IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §§ 924–924a, at 458–60 (3d ed. 1940); see also State v. Wood, 
122 P.2d 416, 418 (Ariz. 1942). 
42. See Anderson, supra note 5, at 54.  As Anderson observes, 
Consent was . . . , in practice and effect, transferable to other parties: if a woman 
consented to sexual intercourse with men to whom she was not married, she was 
deemed indiscriminate in her sexual life.  As a result, her sexual consent lost its 
differentiated and unique nature and she was considered to have functionally 
consented to sex with others. 
Id. (emphasis omitted). 
43. See Galvin, supra note 14, at 783; see also FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2) & advisory committee’s note; 3 
WIGMORE, supra note 41, § 924a, at 459. 
44. People v. Abbot, 19 Wend. 192, 194–96 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1838).  Although the court refers to the 
prosecutrix as being on the “road to prostitution,” the court may have simply viewed this as the 
likely fate of any woman who engaged in sex outside of marriage.  This reading is consistent with 
the court’s later statement: “[A]n isolated instance of criminal connection [i.e., fornication] does 
not make a common prostitute. . . . [I]t only makes a prostitute.”  Id. at 196. 
45. 28 Vt. 512 (1856). 
46. Id. at 514. 
47. 39 P. 622 (1895). 
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This class of evidence is admissible for the purpose of tending to 
show the nonprobability of resistance upon the part of the prose-
cutrix; for it is certainly more probable that a woman who has done 
these things voluntarily in the past would be much more likely to 
consent than one whose past reputation was without blemish, and 
whose personal conduct could not truthfully be assailed.48 
Thus, even in a stranger rape case, a complainant could be subjected to ques-
tions about whether she had had intercourse before, how many times, how old 
she was when she had intercourse for the first time, and with how many men.49  
Defense lawyers relied on this common law rule to also question complainants 
about their use of contraceptives, whether they frequented bars or nightclubs, 
and even their association with blacks.50 
The second rationale for allowing evidence of a complainant’s prior sexual 
conduct was to cast doubt on her veracity as a witness.51  As one scholar noted, 
the assumption was that “promiscuity imports dishonesty.”52  A woman’s lack 
of chastity (in many states enough to make her guilty of the crime of forni-
cation)53 was probative of untruthfulness—not because an unchaste woman was 
more likely to lie to conceal her lack of chastity, but because lack of chastity was 
lower on the scale of depravity than untruthfulness.  As an early court put it, a 
woman “could not have ruthlessly destroyed that quality [of chastity] upon which 
most other good qualities are dependent, and for which, above all others, a woman 
is reverenced and respected, and yet retain her credit for truthfulness un-
smirched.”54  Courts allowed defendants to cross-examine complainants about 
  
48. Id. at 623. 
49. See, e.g., People v. Walker, 310 P.2d 110, 114 (1957) (holding that these questions were proper and 
should have been allowed). 
50. See Berger, supra note 18, at 14–15 nn.90 & 92. 
51. See, e.g., Frank v. State, 150 Neb. 745, 753 (1949); 3 WIGMORE, supra note 41, § 924a, at 459; 
see also Anderson, supra note 5, at 88–89; Galvin, supra note 14, at 787; Leon Letwin, “Unchaste 
Character,” Ideology, and the California Rape Evidence Laws, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 35, 46 (1980) 
(observing that sexual laxity was viewed as indicative of other character traits such as lack of 
honesty).  Of course, disentangling the issue of consent from the issue of a witness’s credibility 
about consent is notoriously difficult, as several scholars have observed.  Galvin put it nicely: 
“Evidence that establishes consent by the complainant will simultaneously impeach her cred-
ibility, and evidence that impeaches her credibility will raise the likelihood of consent.”  Galvin, 
supra note 14, at 775–76. 
52. Berger, supra note 18, at 16. 
53. See generally Coughlin, supra note 29. 
54. State v. Coella, 28 P. 28, 29 (Wash. 1891).  For a persuasive argument that the linkage between a 
woman’s chastity and her truthfulness is traceable to historical assumptions about honor—a woman’s 
honor depended on her chastity, while a man’s honor depended on his being true to his word—
that first developed outside of rape law, see Julia Simon-Kerr, Note, Unchaste and Incredible: The 
Use of Gendered Conceptions of Honor in Impeachment, 117 YALE L.J. 1854 (2008). 
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their prior sexual activity as probative of the issue of credibility, much as Rule 
608(b) of the current Federal Rules of Evidence would allow a defendant to attack 
a witness’s character for truthfulness by cross-examining her about specific instances 
of conduct that are “probative of the character for truthfulness or untruthful-
ness.”55  Tellingly, the assumption that lack of chastity was probative of men-
dacity was gender-specific; no such assumption applied to male witnesses.  The 
Missouri Supreme Court explained the distinction this way: “It is a matter of 
common knowledge that the bad character of a man for chastity does not even in 
the remotest degree affect his character for truth, when based upon that alone, 
while it does that of a woman.”56  The belief in a connection between chastity and 
veracity in women continued well into the twentieth century.  Even John Henry 
Wigmore, the esteemed jurist, assumed a connection.  According to Wigmore, 
there is “at least one situation in which chastity may have a direct connection 
with veracity, viz. when a woman or young girl testifies as a complainant against 
a man charged with a sexual crime.”57 
At the same time that evidentiary rules enabled defendants to cast their ac-
cusers as bad women, or at least narrow the law’s protection to virginal and hence 
deserving women, the generally applicable rules against character evidence typ-
ically allowed defendants to present themselves to factfinders as good men, 
notwithstanding actual evidence to the contrary.  While the complainant’s sex-
ual history was fodder for defense lawyers, the defendant’s sexual history was 
generally off limits.58  At least when it came to white men, conviction was near-
ly impossible unless the men were obviously “despicable cads, unfit for citi-
  
55. FED. R. EVID. 608(b). 
56. State v. Sibley, 33 S.W. 167, 171 (Mo. 1895).  In explaining why the chastity–truthfulness 
connection did not apply to men, the court observed: “Adultery has been committed openly by 
distinguished and otherwise honorable members [of the bar] as well in Great Britain as in our 
own country, yet the offending party has not been supposed to destroy the force of the obligation 
which they feel from the oath of office.”  Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Bank v. Stryker, 1 
Wheeler Crim. Cas. 332).  A California court made a similar distinction, observing that “the sin 
of [being unchaste] in a man is compatible with the virtue of veracity, while in the case of a wo-
man, common opinion is otherwise.”  Sharon v. Hill, 26 F. 337, 360 (C.C.D. Cal. 1885).  For 
an excellent discussion of State v. Sibley, see Simon-Kerr, supra note 54, at 1881–83. 
57. 3 WIGMORE, supra note 41, § 924a, at 459.  For a critique of Wigmore’s views, see Leigh B. 
Bienen, A Question of Credibility: John Henry Wigmore’s Use of Scientific Authority in Section 924a 
of the Treatise on Evidence, 19 CAL. W. L. REV. 235 (1983). 
58. See, e.g., State v. Kirsch, 662 A.2d 937, 941–44 (N.H. 1995); see also United States v. Mound, 
157 F.3d 1153, 1153 (8th Cir. 1998) (Arnold, J., dissenting) (noting in a sexual assault case the 
“centuries-old legal tradition that views propensity evidence [against defendants] with a par-
ticularly skeptical eye”). 
Real Women, Real Rape 839 
 
 
zenship.”59  Even if the defendant had been accused of rape or sexual assault 
before, this information was deemed unduly prejudicial.60 
All this served to frame rape trials as pitting bad women against good men.61  
All this served to tip the scales in a way that benefited these men to the detri-
ment of women. 
B. Agitation for Change 
Feminists responded to these weighted scales by pushing for legal reforms.62  
The result was nothing short of a full-scale revision of existing rape law.  Many 
of these changes were substantive,63 but feminists also secured evidentiary chang-
es as well, such as the elimination of the requirement that a complainant’s testi-
mony be corroborated.64  Even more important, however, was the enactment of 
rape shield laws. 
The story of rape shield laws’ passage has been told before.65  What has been 
glossed over, however, is the speed at which such laws were passed and the ur-
gency with which feminists pressed for passage and warned against long de-
liberation.  In Michigan for example, the Michigan Women’s Task Force on Rape 
  
59. PEGGY REEVES SANDAY, A WOMAN SCORNED: ACQUAINTANCE RAPE ON TRIAL 93 
(1996) (discussing, in particular, rape in the eighteenth century).  For example, a nationwide 
study of nonaggravated acquaintance rape cases between 1954 and 1958 found that jurors re-
turned convictions in just 7 percent of the cases.  See HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE 
AMERICAN JURY 249–55 (Legal Classics Library 1993) (1966).  For a discussion of similar 
findings in nonnationwide studies, see Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 4, at 1251. 
60. See, e.g., Alford v. State, 266 S.W.2d 804 (Ark. 1954) (reversing trial court’s admission of 
complainant’s testimony that defendant had tried to rape her before); Harris v. State, 204 P.2d 305 
(Okla. 1949) (holding it error to admit evidence of defendant’s attempted rape of another woman); 
Thompson v. State, 327 S.W.2d 745 (Tex. 1959) (holding it reversible error to admit evidence 
that defendant previously attempted to rape another woman). 
61. Of course, if a woman was able to meet this image of chastity, then the exclusion of evidence to 
the contrary could work to her benefit.  Cf. Packineau v. United States, 202 F.2d 681, 685 (8th 
Cir. 1953) (finding that the defendant had been unfairly disadvantaged by the exclusion of evi-
dence about the complainant’s sexual history, since its absence likely misled the jury in a case in 
which the complainant gave the impression of being “a very refined girl”). 
62. See generally SPOHN & HORNEY, supra note 6, at 20–21 (describing the role feminists groups, 
including the National Organization for Women, played in lobbying state legislatures to reform 
rape law). 
63. For example, various jurisdictions limited or abolished the resistance requirement, redefined rape 
in gender-neutral terms, abolished the marital immunity rules, and added degrees to the offense 
of sexual assault.  See generally JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 618, 
632–33 (4th ed. 2006). 
64. For a discussion of this requirement, see Armand Arabian, The Cautionary Instruction in Sex Cases: 
A Lingering Insult, 10 SW. U. L. REV. 585 (1978). 
65. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 5; see also SUSAN CARINGELLA, ADDRESSING RAPE REFORM 
IN LAW AND PRACTICE (2009); SPOHN & HORNEY, supra note 6. 
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played a critical role in securing quick passage of a rape shield law and other rape 
reforms.66  Its call for action bears repeating: 
The problem of rape is rapidly approaching epidemic proportions.  
Michigan legislators have a unique opportunity and a pressing re-
sponsibility; immediate legal reform [is necessary] to prevent the 
rape epidemic before it happens . . . . This must be done without 
delay and ahead of any comprehensive criminal code reform.  Without 
prompt action on this crisis, hundreds of people will be assaulted 
while the assaulters continue to virtually go free from any threat of 
conviction.  This certainty far outweighs the uncertain benefits of 
more years of deliberation.67 
Heeding the Task Force’s call to forgo real deliberation, the Michigan leg-
islature passed the country’s first rape shield law,68 which in turn served as a model 
for other states.69  Within two years, more than half the states had adopted some 
type of rape shield.70 
Three other aspects of the quick passage of rape shield laws merit discus-
sion.  First, in pushing for rape reforms, feminists allied themselves not only with 
the state but with the state’s coercive power and, in doing so, played a role in the 
ratcheting up of criminal laws and harsher punishments.  In pushing for 
  
66. See, e.g., Jan BenDor, Justice After Rape: Legal Reform in Michigan, in SEXUAL ASSAULT: THE 
VICTIM AND THE RAPIST 149, 149–51 (Marcia J. Walker & Stanley L. Brodsky eds., 1976).  
According to BenDor’s account, the Michigan Women’s Task Force began with a meeting of 
nonlawyer women in June 1973.  The women reached out to Virginia Nordby, then a part-time 
instructor at Michigan Law School, for help, and Nordby in turn enlisted several of her students 
to help draft a proposed law.  Within six months, the Michigan Women’s Task Force had a pre-
liminary statute in draft form, which was adopted as a proposed bill in February 1974.  Id.  Al-
though there is no legislative history of the various discussions, see Cristina Carmody Tilley, A 
Feminist Repudiation of the Rape Shield Laws, 51 DRAKE L. REV. 45, 55 (2002), it is known that 
the proposed reforms were approved by the legislature on July 13, 1974, near the end of its ses-
sion.  BenDor, supra, at 149. 
67. MICH. WOMEN’S TASK FORCE ON RAPE, BACKGROUND MATERIAL FOR A PROPOSAL FOR 
CRIMINAL CODE REFORM TO RESPOND TO MICHIGAN’S RAPE CRISIS 1 (1973). 
68. It provided, in relevant part, the following: 
Evidence of specific instances of the victim’s sexual conduct, opinion evidence 
of the victim’s sexual conduct, and reputation evidence of the victim’s sexual con-
duct shall not be admitted . . . unless and only to the extent that the judge finds that 
the following proposed evidence is material to a fact at issue in the case and that 
its inflammatory or prejudicial nature does not outweigh its probative value: 
(a)  Evidence of the victim’s past sexual conduct with the actor, [or] 
(b) Evidence of specific instances of sexual activity showing the source or origin 
of semen, pregnancy, or disease. 
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520j(1) (West 1991). 
69. See CUKLANZ, supra note 34, at 3. 
70. Galvin, supra note 14, at 765 n.3.  For a list of these state reform laws, see Berger, supra note 18, at 
32 n.196. 
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reforms that would make prosecuting rape cases easier, feminist reformers found 
ready allies in police departments and district attorneys’ offices.71  To borrow 
from Aya Gruber, “As the United States became more and more punitive, fem-
inists hopped on the bandwagon by vigorously advocating reforms to strengthen 
the operation of criminal law to combat gendered crimes.”72 
Second, feminists joined this alliance at a time when rape law, which sure-
ly disadvantaged female complainants,73 also disadvantaged nonwhite men.74  
Between 1930 and 1967, 89 percent of all of the men officially executed for rape 
in the United States were black.75  Even more telling, the overwhelming ma-
jority of these executions—85 percent—involved a particular dyad, black male 
defendants and white female victims.76  Indeed, a black man found guilty of 
raping a white woman was eighteen times more likely to receive a death sen-
tence than an offender in any other offender–victim dyad.77  In their effort to 
  
71. SPOHN & HORNEY, supra note 6, at 20 (noting that feminists “were joined in their efforts by 
crime-control advocates, notably police and prosecutors” and that together “these groups formed a 
powerful, although perhaps ill-matched, coalition for change”). 
72. Gruber, supra note 8, at 583.  For additional critique of this alliance and the “subsumption of the 
feminist movement into the state’s goal of managing undesirables,” see Aya Gruber, The Feminist 
War on Crime, 92 IOWA L. REV. 741, 825 (2007).  See also Joshua Dressler, Where We Have 
Been, and Where We Might Be Going: Some Cautionary Reflections on Rape Law Reform, 46 CLEV. 
ST. L. REV. 409, 412 (1998) (“Many feminists . . . have allied themselves with political 
conservatives. . . . Strange bedfellows like this can produce unwanted offspring.”); Janet Halley 
et al., From the International to the Local in Feminist Legal Responses to Rape, Prostitution/Sex 
Work, and Sex Trafficking: Four Studies in Contemporary Governance Feminism, 29 HARV. J.L. & 
GENDER 335, 340–42 (2006); Dianne L. Martin, Commentary, Retribution Revisited: A 
Reconsideration of Feminist Criminal Law Reform Strategies, 36 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 151, 158–
59 (1998). 
73. Even this disadvantage must be qualified.  While most rape complainants were disadvantaged as 
women, they were also advantaged as white.  “Even as a female perspective on rape was validated 
in legal statutes, it continued to favor the dominant white culture through preferential treatment 
of European-American defendants and a disproportionate disregard for the word of African-
American victims.”  CUKLANZ, supra note 34, at 30; see also SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST 
OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE 216 (1975) (discussing a study showing that whites 
accused of raping black women received relatively mild sentences, while blacks accused of raping 
white women received the harshest sentences). 
74. Indeed, it was concern about the racialized use of rape laws, especially in the South, that led the 
Model Penal Code’s drafters to include provisions that would tip the scales in favor of defendants.  
See Gruber, supra note 8, at 588. 
75. See Marvin E. Wolfgang, Racial Discrimination in the Death Sentence for Rape, in EXECUTIONS 
IN AMERICA 109, 114 (William J. Bowers ed., 1974). 
76. U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 205455, CRIMINAL 
VICTIMIZATION, 2003, at 7 (2004). 
77. Marvin E. Wolfgang & Marc Riedel, Race, Judicial Discretion, and the Death Penalty, 407 
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 119, 130 (1973); see also Marvin E. Wolfgang & Marc 
Riedel, Rape, Racial Discrimination and the Death Penalty, in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE 
UNITED STATES 99, 111–12 (Hugo Adam Bedau & Chester M. Pierce eds., 1976).  The racial 
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redress the imbalance in favor of defendants that historically existed in intrara-
cial cases, feminists failed to concern themselves with how their reforms would 
exacerbate the imbalance that existed in interracial cases, namely those involv-
ing nonwhite defendants and white women.78 
The third aspect, which is discussed more fully in Part III, is that in pushing 
for reforms, feminist groups paid little attention to how such reforms might 
impact rape victims who did not fit the white, middle-class mold of their con-
stituents.79  It was not just nonwhite defendants who became a collateral conse-
quence of feminist reforms.  Women of color also suffered by omission.80  The 
rape reforms pressed by feminists, after all, did nothing to address the fact that 
judges were imposing more lenient sentences for rape when the victim was 
black.81  Nor did feminists seem concerned with studies that showed the differ-
ential in police decisions to charge for rape “resulted primarily from lack of con-
fidence in the veracity of black complainants and a belief in the myth of black 
promiscuity.”82 
In fact, as I demonstrate in Part III, on a certain level the rape shield laws 
enacted in the 1970s have harmed all women.  Far from liberating women from 
our long history of measuring their worth against a chastity yardstick, rape shield 
rules have in fact reinstantiated chastity norms.  Instead of subverting the chas-
tity requirement, rape shield laws buy into them, allowing, in theory at least, any 
complainant in a rape trial to wipe her sexual history clean, to become a good 
  
disparity in such executions likely played a role in the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Coker v. 
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977), abolishing the death penalty as a punishment for rape. 
78. It should be noted that this lack of concern about the disparate impact of rape shield laws was not 
inevitable.  In fact, it stood in stark contrast with the concerns raised by women’s groups, just a few 
years earlier, about the use of the death penalty as a punishment for rape and the dispro-
portionate use of this penalty on black men.  See Brief for ACLU et al. as Amici Curiae at 16, 
Coker, 433 U.S. 584 (No. 75-5444), 1976 WL 181482. 
79. The myopia of the Michigan Women’s Task Force on Rape is evident from the language used in 
its background materials urging reform.  For example, the materials state, “Women are the victims 
of rape because American society portrays women as passive [and] weak.”  MICH. WOMEN’S 
TASK FORCE ON RAPE, supra note 67, at 8.  While this assumption was routinely applied to white 
women, different assumptions often attached to women of color.  For a discus-sion of how 
lawmakers and even the Supreme Court have conflated “women” with “white wo-men,” see I. 
Bennett Capers, Reading Back, Reading Black, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 9, 16–18 (2006). 
80. As critical race scholar Mari Matsuda has observed, change that benefits everyone is best effect-
ed by looking to the bottom—that is, looking to those most affected by discrimination—as a 
starting point.  See Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 
22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323 (1987).  This was not done in the case of rape reform. 
81. See Jennifer Wriggins, Note, Rape, Racism, and the Law, 6 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 103, 118–22 (1983). 
82. Comment, Police Discretion and the Judgment That a Crime Has Been Committed—Rape in 
Philadelphia, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 277, 304 (1968). 
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girl again, to be brought back into the fold, and thus receive the protection of the 
law.  This is what rape shield laws do. 
II. THE REVOLUTION 
Building on their success in securing a rape shield law in Michigan, fem-
inist advocates turned their attention to passing similar rape shield laws in other 
states and in the federal system.  This Part accordingly begins with an overview 
of that effort and the resulting federal rape shield rule, Rule 412.  I then turn to 
Rule 412’s companion rule, Rule 413, which functions as a rape sword.  This Part 
concludes with an exploration of some of the troubling consequences of these 
rules. 
A. Federal Rules of Evidence 412 and 413 
Within two years of securing passage of a rape shield law in Michigan, 
feminist advocates were able to secure similar rape shield laws in more than half 
the states and had begun the process of securing passage of a rape shield law in 
the federal system.  To a large extent, the state-by-state effort, and then the fed-
eral effort, followed a similar playbook to the Michigan effort.  Indeed, ad-
vocates provided a “legislative fact sheet” to Congress that borrowed heavily from 
the “background material” the Michigan Women’s Task Force on Rape had 
circulated to Michigan legislators just a few years earlier.83  In addition, Judge 
Patricia Boyle of the Michigan Women’s Task Force on Rape testified before the 
House Judiciary Committee.84  Again, little attention was paid to how such re-
forms would operate in cases involving nonwhite victims or to how such reforms 
might reinscribe the chastity requirement.85 
The result was Federal Rule of Evidence 412, which was signed into law 
on October 28, 1978, as the centerpiece of the Privacy Protection for Rape 
Victims Act of 1978.86  The bill’s principal sponsor, Representative Elizabeth 
Holtzman, captured the sentiments of feminist reformers in urging passage. 
  
83. The “legislative fact sheet” is quoted in Wallace D. Loh, The Impact of Common Law and Reform 
Rape Statutes on Prosecution: An Empirical Study, 55 WASH. L. REV. 543, 571–72 (1980). 
84. See Privacy of Rape Victims: Hearings on H.R. 14666 and Other Bills Before the Subcomm. on Crim. 
Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 77 (1976) [hereinafter Privacy of Rape 
Victims] (statement of Judge Patricia Boyle).  For a more complete discussion of the legislative 
history leading to passage of Rule 412, see Tilley, supra note 66, at 53–60. 
85. See Privacy of Rape Victims, supra note 84. 
86. Privacy Protection for Rape Victims Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-540, 92 Stat. 2046 (1978). 
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Too often in this country victims of rape are humiliated and ha-
rassed when they report and prosecute the rape.  Bullied and cross-
examined about their prior sexual experiences, many find the trial 
almost as degrading as the rape itself.  Since rape trials become in-
quisitions into the victim’s morality, not trials of the defendant’s 
innocence or guilt, it is not surprising that it is the least reported 
crime.  It is estimated that as few as one in ten rapes is ever reported. 
. . . [I]n federal courts, . . . it is permissible still to subject rape 
victims to brutal cross-examination about their past sexual histories.  
H.R. 4727 would rectify this problem in Federal courts and I hope, 
also serve as a model to suggest to the remaining states that reform of 
existing rape laws is important to the equity of our criminal justice 
system.87 
Then-Senator Joe Biden added the following: 
The enactment of this legislation will eliminate the traditional 
defense strategy . . . of placing the victim and her reputation on trial 
in lieu of the defendant [and] end the practice . . . wherein rape 
victims are bullied and cross-examined about their prior sexual ex-
periences[, making] the trial almost as degrading as the rape itself.88 
The resulting rule, Rule 412, declares evidence of a victim’s past sexual 
behavior or sexual predisposition inadmissible in any civil or criminal proceed-
ing involving alleged sexual misconduct, unless one of three exceptions ap-
plies.89  One, such evidence may be admitted when offered “to prove that someone 
other than the defendant was the source of semen, injury, or other physical 
evidence.”90  Two, such evidence may be admitted if it consists of “specific 
  
87. 124 CONG. REC. 34,913 (1978) (statement of Rep. Holtzman). 
88. Id. at 36,256 (statement of Sen. Biden). 
89. FED. R. EVID. 412(a).  For example, the rape shield rule has resulted in the exclusion of the fol-
lowing evidence at trial: (1) the alleged victim’s “general reputation in and around the Army 
post”; (2) the victim’s “habit of calling out to the barracks to speak to various and sundry soldiers”; 
(3) the victim’s “habit of coming to the post to meet people and of her habit for being at the 
barracks at the snack bar”; (4) evidence from the alleged victim’s former landlord regarding his 
experience with her promiscuity; and (5) a social worker’s opinion of the alleged victim.  Doe v. 
United States, 666 F.2d 43, 47 (4th Cir. 1981) (quoting district court opinion) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
90. FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(1)(A).  For example, in a rape trial in which the prosecution sought to 
introduce evidence that a rape kit examination following the alleged incident revealed the pres-
ence of semen, the defense would be permitted to introduce evidence that the semen originated 
from another person.  This exception is sometimes referred to as the “Scottsboro rebuttal,” based 
on the case in which nine black youths were accused of raping two white women on a freight 
train.  23 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE § 5388 (Supp. 2012).  In its case in chief, the prosecution offered medical 
testimony to establish the presence of semen.  In response, the defense was eventually allowed to 
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instances of a victim’s sexual behavior with respect to the person accused” and is 
offered by the defense to prove consent or by the prosecution.91  Three, such 
evidence is admissible if the exclusion of such evidence “would violate the 
defendant’s constitutional rights.”92 
More than a decade later, feminist reformers secured a companion rule to 
Rule 412.93  Again aligning themselves with police and prosecutors, feminists94 
argued that further reforms were necessary to obtain convictions in sexual 
assault cases and to “protect the public from crimes of sexual violence.”95  The 
principal House sponsor, Representative Susan Molinari, argued that “sexual 
assault cases are distinctive,” warranting distinctive rules concerning the ad-
  
introduce (1) evidence that the women, who were both prostitutes, had had intercourse with 
two other men the night before; and (2) medical testimony both that the small amount of semen 
found was inconsistent with the gang rape allegation and that the semen was nonmotile, 
indicating it had been present at least twelve hours prior to the women boarding the train.  DAN 
T. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO: A TRAGEDY OF THE AMERICAN SOUTH 81–84, 213, 229–30 
(1969).  Notwithstanding the paucity of the evidence and the fact that one of the women 
recanted and testified for the defense, the nine youths were repeatedly convicted.  JAMES 
GOODMAN, STORIES OF SCOTTSBORO 393–95 (1994). 
91. FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(1)(B).  Thus, where the defense is consent, the rape shield rule would not 
prohibit the defendant from introducing evidence, through cross-examination or otherwise, that 
he had previously engaged in consensual sexual activity with his accuser.  For example, in People 
v. Jovanovic, 700 N.Y.S.2d 156, 167 (App. Div. 1999), the court ruled that emails in which the 
accuser described herself as enjoying sadomasochistic sex and enjoying being a “slave” were ad-
missible as conduct with the accused.  Id. at 164–67.  It should be noted that this exception, rather 
than changing the common law, is consistent with the common law. 
92. FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(1)(C).  This exception has been described as a catch basin because it allows 
courts wide discretion in determining when a state’s interest in excluding sexual history must give 
way to a defendant’s right to confront witnesses or present a defense.  See Galvin, supra note 14, 
at 775.  This exception has been read as allowing the admission of sexual history evidence to show 
bias, see Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227, 233 (1988), to show evidence of prior sexual abuse, 
see LaJoie v. Thompson, 217 F.3d 663, 673 (9th Cir. 2000), and to show prior false accusations, 
see Redmond v. Kingston, 240 F.3d 590, 592 (7th Cir. 2001). 
93. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 
1796 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 16, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.). 
94. Not all feminists supported the passage of Rule 413.  Notably, the National Organization of 
Women’s Legal Defense Fund opposed the rule out of concern that it would diminish basic 
safeguards accorded criminal defendants.  See 140 CONG. REC. 15,210 (1994) (statement of 
Rep. Schumer) (expressing the concerns of various groups); see also Katharine K. Baker, Once a 
Rapist? Motivational Evidence and Relevancy in Rape Law, 110 HARV. L. REV. 563, 569 n.24 
(1997).  Indeed, the push for Rule 413 by Rep. Susan Molinari and Sen. Bob Dole, both 
Republicans, was viewed by some feminists as politically motivated: By supporting Rule 413, the 
Republican Party could position themselves as committed to women’s issues.  Telephone Interview 
with Lynn Hecht Schafran, Dir. of the Nat’l Judicial Educ. Program of Legal Momentum, 
Women’s Legal Def. & Educ. Fund (Nov. 16, 2012).  For more on the legislative history and 
politics behind Rule 413, see Michael S. Ellis, Comment, The Politics Behind Federal Rules of 
Evidence 413, 414, and 415, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 961 (1998). 
95. 140 CONG. REC. 20,602 (1994). 
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missibility of propensity evidence against defendants.96  Specifically, Molinari 
argued that because adult-victim sexual assault cases often turn on credibility 
determinations, informing jurors of a defendant’s past sexual conduct could be 
critical in “accurately deciding cases that would otherwise become unresolvable 
swearing matches.”97  The result was Rule 413, a rape sword.98  Enacted as part 
of the Violence Against Women Act, Rule 413 has rightfully been described as 
effecting “a breathtaking change in a long-established principle of Anglo-
American law,”99 as marking “a sea change,”100 and as running “counter to a 
centuries-old legal tradition that views propensity evidence with a particularly 
skeptical eye.”101  In a complete reversal of the prohibition, codified in Rule 
404, against the admission of character or propensity evidence to prove action 
in conformity therewith, Rule 413 permits the government to introduce evi-
dence of a defendant’s relevant prior sexual conduct for precisely that pur-
pose,102  regardless of whether such conduct resulted in charges or a conviction.103  
As Katherine Baker observed, Rule 413 “now singles out sexual assault as the 
only crime to which the general prior act rule does not apply.”104 
In short, through Rules 412 and 413 feminist reformers secured a 
complete reversal of the common law approach to rape cases.  Whereas once a 
complainant’s sexual past was fair game at rape trials105 and a defendant’s sexual 
past was generally off limits,106 these new rules, at least notionally, cloak a 
  
96. Id. at 23,603. 
97. Id. 
98. As part of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Congress also passed Rule 414, which 
allows propensity evidence to be admitted against defendants in child sexual assault cases, and 
Rule 415, which allows propensity evidence in civil cases involving a claim of sexual assault.  All 
three rules—Rules 413, 414, and 415—became effective on July 9, 1995. See FED. R. EVID. 
413–415. 
99. PAUL C. GIANNELLI, UNDERSTANDING EVIDENCE § 10.05, at 155 (3d ed. 2009). 
100. United States v. Guardia, 135 F.3d 1326, 1330 (10th Cir. 1998) (observing that Rule 413 “marks a 
sea change in the federal rules’ approach to character evidence”). 
101. United States v. Mound, 157 F.3d 1153, 1153 (8th Cir. 1998) (Arnold, J., dissenting from 
denial of rehearing en banc).  For a discussion of the historical origins of the rule that character 
evidence is inadmissible to show propensity, see Julius Stone, The Rule of Exclusion of Similar Fact 
Evidence: America, 51 HARV. L. REV. 988 (1938). 
102. FED. R. EVID. 413; see also 140 CONG. REC. 23,603 (1994) (explaining that Rule 413 “will su-
persede in sex offense cases the restrictive aspects of Federal rule of evidence 404(b)[, which 
generally prohibits] evidence of character or propensity”). 
103. 140 CONG. REC. 23,603 (“Evidence of offenses for which the defendant has not previously been 
prosecuted or convicted will be admissible, as well as evidence of prior convictions.”). 
104. Baker, supra note 94, at 569. 
105. See supra notes 38–40 and accompanying text. 
106. See, e.g., Lannan v. State, 600 N.E.2d 1334 (Ind. 1992) (rejecting the use of propensity evidence 
against a defendant in a sexual assault case); State v. Kirsch, 662 A.2d 937 (N.H. 1995). 
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complainant in a presumption of chastity and render a defendant’s sexual his-
tory fair game.  I explore the implications of this reversal below. 
B. Good Women, Bad Men 
Using an array of cases, this Subpart explores three troubling conse-
quences of rape shield and rape sword laws.  First, the cases demonstrate that 
the primary argument in support of rape shield rules—that a victim’s sexual 
history is completely irrelevant—cannot be squared with the routine admission 
of other seemingly irrelevant information.  Second, the cases reveal that rape 
shield rules are internally inconsistent.  Third, and perhaps most importantly, 
the cases point to one of the overarching consequences of rape shield and rape 
sword rules: that complainants, in theory at least, are now cast as invariably 
good, while rape defendants are cast as intrinsically and indelibly bad. 
1. The Irrelevance Fallacy 
Beyond tipping the scales, case law reveals a fallacy in the arguments used 
to support the rape shield and the rape sword.  The primary argument in sup-
port of both rules is one based on relevance.  Feminist scholars argue vocif-
erously that a woman’s sexual history simply has no bearing on whether or not 
she consented to sex on the occasion in question, let alone whether she is cred-
ible.107  Put differently, feminists argue that consent to sex is not transferable 
and that consent to sex on a prior occasion cannot possibly evidence “consent 
always.”108  For starters, this argument misses a crucial distinction.  While con-
sent to sex is not probative of “consent always,” it is slightly probative of consent 
in the future, and that is the critical issue for assessing relevance in a given case.  
But more importantly here, the routine admission of other seemingly irrelevant 
information in criminal trials, including rape prosecutions, belies the irrel-
evance argument. 
Consider People v. Jovanovic,109 which involved the application of rape 
shield laws and which appears in several criminal law casebooks110 and evidence 
  
107. See, e.g., Tuerkheimer, supra note 12, at 1467–68 (“Regardless of normative assessments of its 
worth, sexual history is not probative of consent.”).   
108. See, e.g., Hunter, supra note 4, at 131; see also Berger, supra note 18, at 55–56; Galvin, supra note 
14, at 799 (“[T]he mere fact that the complainant has previously engaged in consensual sexual 
activity affords no basis for inferring consent on a later occasion.”). 
109. 700 N.Y.S.2d 156 (App. Div. 1999). 
110. See, e.g., MARKUS D. DUBBER & MARK G. KELMAN, AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW: CASES, 
STATUTES AND COMMENTS 797 (2d ed. 2009). 
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casebooks.111  Oliver Jovanovic was convicted of kidnapping, sexual abuse, and 
assault based on evidence that, after inviting a young woman he met online to 
his room, he tied her to his bed and, over the course of twenty hours, dropped 
hot candle wax on her skin, bit her nipples, and molested her with a baton.112  
Relying on a rape shield rule, the trial court barred several pieces of evidence 
from the jury.113  For example, the jury was never made aware of email corre-
spondence between the complainant and Jovanovic in which she described her 
prior involvement with a “heroin addicted, bisexual atheist[;] . . . [m]y kinda 
comrad [sic]” who “got me” and introduced her to sadomasochism.114  Nor was 
the jury made aware of her boast to Jovanovic that, “I’m what those happy pain 
fiends at the Vault [a New York S&M club] call a ‘pushy bottom.’”115 
My point here is not to weigh in on the correct application of the rape shield 
in this case.  In fact, the Jovanovic appellate court reversed on the ground that 
the conduct fell within the “prior conduct with the accused” and the “interest of 
justice” exceptions.116  Rather, the point here is that the case shows how weak 
the standard irrelevance argument really is.  The standard argument of rape shield 
proponents is that a victim’s prior sexual conduct has little if any probative value 
with respect to the twin issues of consent and a defendant’s reasonable belief in 
the existence of consent.117  Here, the evidence of the complainant’s discussions 
of sadomasochism with Jovanovic was clearly relevant to both issues.118  After all, 
Rule 401 is to be construed liberally, defining as “relevant” evidence having “any 
tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evi-
dence.”119  Indeed, as George Fisher has observed, it “would be hard to devise 
a more lenient test of probativeness than Rule 401’s ‘any tendency’ standard.”120 
But the greater problem is that the standard relevancy argument cannot be 
squared with the routine admission of so much other background evidence.  For 
example, in Jovanovic, the jury learned that the complainant was a “Barnard un-
dergraduate” who was from “Salamanca, a small town in upstate New York,” and 
  
111. See, e.g., GEORGE FISHER, EVIDENCE 319 (2d ed. 2008). 
112. Jovanovic, 700 N.Y.S.2d at 161–62. 
113. Id. at 163. 
114. Id. 
115. Id. at 164. 
116. Id. at 166–68. 
117. See Berger, supra note 18; Tuerkheimer, supra note 12, at 1470. 
118. By contrast, as I argue below, evidence of a complainant’s past enjoyment of sadomasochism would 
normally be completely irrelevant, and hence inadmissible, in a stranger rape case or even an ac-
quaintance rape case in which the accused had no knowledge of the complainant’s sexual history.  
See infra notes 255–260 and accompanying text. 
119. FED. R. EVID. 401 & advisory committee’s notes (emphasis added). 
120. FISHER, supra note 111, at 19. 
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that she initially entered an online chat room hoping to find “other Columbia 
students.”121  The jury learned that Jovanovic was studying molecular genetics 
and computational biology at Columbia, and that he ran a small multimedia 
design firm with his brother.122  The jury also learned that Jovanovic was a fan 
of the photographer Joel-Peter Witkin, whom he described as a creator of pho-
tographs using corpses,123 and that when the complainant went to Jovanovic’s 
room, they watched “Meet the Feebles,” a video in which “Muppet-like characters 
engage in sexual or violent behavior.”124  Can one really say that such background 
information, which is routinely admitted in criminal trials,125 meets the threshold 
of relevance, but that a complainant’s sexual history normally does not?126 
2. Internal Inconsistency 
The flaw in the standard irrelevance argument is compounded when one 
considers one of the three exceptions to the rape shield bar—namely, the allow-
ance of evidence of sexual history between the complainant and the accused.127  
If one accepts the notion that an individual always has the right to withhold con-
  
121. Jovanovic, 700 N.Y.S.2d at 159. 
122. Id. at 160. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. at 161.  The admission of such background evidence is not atypical.  Consider State v. Rusk, 
424 A.2d 720 (Md. 1981), another rape case that appears in many criminal law casebooks.  In 
Rusk, the jurors learned that the complainant was twenty-one years old, that she had just at-
tended a high school alumnae meeting, that she and a friend then went out for drinks where she 
met that defendant, and that before going out for drinks, she telephoned her mother, who was 
babysitting for her two-year old son.  Id. at 721. 
125. See 1 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 9, at 658–61 
(Peter Tillers rev. ed., Little, Brown and Co. 1983); Arthur H. Travers, Jr., An Essay on the 
Determination of Relevancy Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 1977 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 327, 345–47 
& nn.35–36 (discussing whether reference to background facts in the Advisory Committee’s 
Note to Rule 401 creates a separate and distinct basis for the admission of background evi-
dence).  One of the leading books on trial techniques specifically encourages lawyers to begin direct 
examination with such background questions.  See THOMAS A. MAUET, FUNDAMENTALS OF 
TRIAL TECHNIQUES § 4.2 (3d ed. 1992). 
126. Of course, there is the alternative argument that sexual history evidence should be excluded because 
jurors may give it undue weight and allow it to bear too strongly on their determination of the 
facts.  While this argument was particularly strong when rape shields swept the country, shifting 
mores suggest the argument is far weaker now and is likely to continue to weaken in the 
foreseeable future.  See infra notes 261–289 and accompanying text.  More to the point, this is 
precisely the type of balancing analysis that judges are equipped to handle. 
127. See FED. R. EVID. 412.  The allowance of sexual history evidence between the complainant and 
the defendant existed at common law and was justified on the ground that such evidence was 
probative of “an emotion towards the particular defendant tending to allow him to repeat the 
liberty.”  3 WIGMORE, supra note 41, § 200, at 688. 
850 60 UCLA L. REV. 826 (2013) 
 
sent, whether the person seeking consent is her husband,128 her boyfriend, or a 
stranger, then allowing an exception to the rape shield in these cases is difficult 
to justify.  For example, the link between acts of domestic violence and rape is 
well known.  Under the standard rape shield rule, if a man beats a woman, threat-
ening to “fix her face,” and then rapes her, as was the case in State v. Alston,129 the 
rape shield rule provides no bar to his introducing her history of consenting to 
sex, so long as the woman is his girlfriend or wife and the prior consenting oc-
casions were with him.  This exception is particularly problematic since it 
seems to be a vestige of the common law marital rape exemption,130 when wo-
men were considered the property of their husbands131 or as having granted 
consent in perpetuity as part of their wedding vows.132  New York State adds an 
even more troubling exception.  New York exempts evidence of a complainant’s 
past conviction of prostitution from its general ban on sexual history evidence133  
But again, this begs the question.  If prior sexual history is generally irrelevant, 
then why should it be relevant in the case of sex workers?134 
Further inconsistencies become apparent when one examines non-heartland 
cases.  One such inconsistency is in the primary justification for rape shields: that 
  
128. For a discussion of the demise of marital immunity for rape, see Jill Elaine Hasday, Contest and 
Consent: A Legal History of Marital Rape, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1373 (2000). 
129. 312 S.E.2d 470, 472 (N.C. 1984).  For an interesting discussion of the case, see Camille A. Nelson, 
Consistently Revealing the Inconsistencies: The Construction of Fear in Criminal Law, 48 ST. LOUIS 
U. L.J. 1261, 1277 & n.88, 1278 (2004). 
130. 1 MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 628–29 (Robert H. 
Small 1847) (1736).  See generally DIANA E.H. RUSSELL, RAPE IN MARRIAGE (rev. ed. 1990); 
Hasday, supra note 128. 
131. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *444.  As the evolutionary psychologist Steven 
Pinker pithily put it, 
“Thou shalt not rape” is not one of the Ten Commandments, though the tenth one 
does reveal the status of a woman in that world: she is enumerated in a list of her 
husband’s chattels, after his house and before his servants and livestock. 
STEVEN PINKER, THE BETTER ANGELS OF OUR NATURE: WHY VIOLENCE HAS 
DECLINED 395 (2011).  The woman-as-property trope may no longer exist as a matter of law, 
but remnants exist in practice.  “Women, but not men, wear engagement rings to signal they are 
‘taken,’ and many are still ‘given away’ at their weddings by their fathers to their husbands, 
whereupon they change their surname accordingly.”  Id. at 397. 
132. Sir Matthew Hale put it more delicately: “[B]y their mutual matrimonial consent and contract 
the wife hath given up herself in this kind unto her husband, which she cannot retract.”  HALE, 
supra note 130, at 628. 
133. See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.42(2) (McKinney 2004) (“Evidence of a victim’s sexual 
conduct shall not be admissible in a prosecution for [rape] unless such evidence . . . proves or tends 
to prove that the victim has been convicted of [prostitution] within three years prior to the sex 
offense which is the subject of the prosecution . . . .”). 
134. For a critique of this exception, see Karin S. Portlock, Note, Status on Trial: The Racial 
Ramifications of Admitting Prostitution Evidence Under State Rape Shield Legislation, 107 
COLUM. L. REV. 1404 (2007). 
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sexual history is irrelevant.  If a complainant’s sexual history is generally ir-
relevant to the issue of consent, then it should also be irrelevant when the com-
plainant herself seeks to introduce such evidence.  However, courts responding 
to requests by complainants to introduce evidence of their prior chastity have 
allowed such evidence.135  Similarly, at least one court has allowed a com-
plainant to introduce evidence that she identified as a lesbian to buttress her claim 
that sex with the male defendant was nonconsensual.136  In same-sex rape cases, 
at least one court has allowed a defendant to introduce evidence of the same-
sex preference of his accuser as probative of consent.137  That sexual history is 
deemed relevant and admissible in these cases—when offered by the com-
plainant or when offered by defendants in same-sex rape cases—shows the in-
consistency in the irrelevancy argument put forward by rape shield supporters. 
Lastly, to the extent that supporters of the rape shield rule rely on the al-
ternative argument of prejudice, that argument is also problematic.138  At the 
time rape shield laws swept the nation, there was still shame attached to the no-
tion of premarital sex.139  But mores have changed dramatically in the past sev-
eral years; much prejudice that existed in the early 1970s is all but absent now.140 
  
135. See, e.g., People v. Prentiss, 172 P.3d 917 (Colo. App. 2006); State v. Preston, 427 A.2d 32 
(N.H. 1981); State v. Gavigan, 330 N.W.2d 571 (Wis. 1983); see also Commonwealth v. 
McKay, 294 N.E.2d 213 (Mass. 1973) (concluding that virginity has probative value on the issue 
of consent but that lack of virginity does not). 
136. See, e.g., Meaders v. United States, 519 A.2d 1248, 1256–57 (D.C. 1986) (Gallagher, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“It is almost too obvious to mention that—where con-
sent is the issue (as here)—if the complaining witness offers on direct examination, among other 
things, that she is a lesbian, this may seriously impair a defense of consent to the charged rape.”); 
State v. Lessley, 601 N.W.2d 521, 526–28 (Neb. 1999); State v. Williams, 477 N.E.2d 221, 228 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1984). 
137. State v. Rodgers, No. 01-C-01-9011-CR-00312, 1991 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 648 (Aug. 
16, 1991).  In another case, the court allowed such evidence to counter the impression the com-
plainant gave that he was heterosexual.  People v. Murphy, 899 P.2d 294, 296–97 (Colo. App. 
1994).  For a fuller discussion of rape shield laws in male-victim rape cases, see Elizabeth J. 
Kramer, Note, When Men Are Victims: Applying Rape Shield Laws to Male Same-Sex Rape, 73 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 293 (1998). 
138. Rule 412 is really a specialized application of Rules 401 and 403.  At bottom, supporters of Rule 
412 were “loath to leave determinations of general ‘relevancy’ to judges who are too frequently 
male and too frequently imbued with unreal and insensitive attitudes toward women’s sexual at-
titudes and experiences.”  BARBARA ALLEN BABCOCK ET AL., SEX DISCRIMINATION AND 
THE LAW: CAUSES AND REMEDIES 843 (1975). 
139. See infra notes 276–289 and accompanying text. 
140. The push for rape shield laws also coincided with a period in which women were still excused 
from jury service.  See I. Bennett Capers, Blind Justice, 24 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 179, 183 
(2012).  The increased representation of women on juries further militates against the concern 
for prejudice.  See Tilley, supra note 66, at 66–73. 
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With respect to Rule 413, the rape sword rule, supporters’ arguments in 
support likewise fail.141  In support of Rule 413, proponents in effect did an 
about-face, arguing that “sexual assault cases are distinctive” and that when it 
comes to defendants, “a history of similar acts tends to be exceptionally pro-
bative.”142  While there is empirical support for the notion that one who com-
mits a sexual offense is more likely to be a repeat offender, empirical evidence 
makes clear that the recidivism rates for sexual offenders are actually lower than 
for many other categories of crimes for which the normal ban against pro-
pensity evidence continues to apply.143  Not surprisingly, the Advisory Committee 
on Evidence Rules, after seeking public input and considering eighty-four written 
comments, opposed the addition of Rule 413.144  Their opposition was un-
animous except for a dissenting vote from the Department of Justice.145  In 
  
141. Tellingly, Rule 413 was passed in the absence of any evidence to support proponents’ claims that 
sex offenses are distinctive and that evidence of past sexual behavior, when applied to 
defendants, is “typically relevant and probative.”  See 140 CONG. REC. 23,602–03 (1994) 
(statement of Rep. Susan Molinari). 
142. Id. at 23,603.  This about-face has been noted by other scholars.  Orenstein notes, “There is an 
apparent inconsistency in feminists’ insisting on a rape shield, which limits ‘character evidence’ 
of the woman, yet simultaneously calling for expansion of the character evidence against de-
fendants in sexual crimes.”  Aviva Orenstein, Feminism and Evidence, in CRITICAL ESSAYS, 
RESEARCH AGENDA, AND BIBLIOGRAPHY 507, 520 (Betty Taylor et al. eds., 1997).  That 
said, Rule 413 does not stand in complete opposition to Rule 412.  Rule 413 does not permit 
evidence of a defendant’s consensual sexual behavior—the type of evidence once admissible 
against complainants—but only evidence of a defendant’s past assaultive or nonconsensual sex-
ual behavior.  On the false symmetry of Rules 412 and 413, see Debra Sherman Tedeschi, 
Comment, Federal Rule of Evidence 413: Redistributing “The Credibility Quotient,” 57 U. PITT. L. 
REV. 107, 116–18 (1995). 
143. Baker, supra note 94, at 578; see also Thomas J. Reed, Reading Gaol Revisited: Admission of 
Uncharged Misconduct Evidence in Sex Offender Cases, 21 AM. J. CRIM. L. 127, 149–50 (1993).  
Of course, determining recidivism rates for rapists is complicated by the fact that the vast ma-
jority of rapes go unreported.  It should be noted that when offenders are interviewed about their 
conduct and granted assurances of confidentiality, their self-reported recidivism rates are quite 
high.  For example, in one study of 126 rapists, the mean number of self-reported rapes was 
seven.  See Gene G. Abel et al., Self-Reported Sex Crimes of Nonincarcerated Paraphiliacs, 2 J. 
INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 3, 16 (1987); see also David Lisak & Paul M. Miller, Repeat Rape 
and Multiple Offending Among Undetected Rapists, 17 VIOLENCE  & VICTIMS 73, 74 (2002). 
144. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ON 
THE ADMISSION OF CHARACTER EVIDENCE IN CERTAIN SEXUAL MISCONDUCT CASES 
(1995), reprinted in 159 F.R.D. 51, 52–53 (1995). 
145. Id.  Indeed, the Report itself emphasizes this point.  The Report concludes, “It is important to 
note the highly unusual unanimity of the members of the Standing and Advisory Committees, 
composed of over 40 judges, practicing lawyers, and academicians, in taking the view that Rule[] 
413 [is] undesirable.  Indeed, the only supporters of the Rules were representatives of the 
Department of Justice.”  Id. at 53.  The limited scholarship focusing on Rule 413 has also been 
critical.  See, e.g., James Joseph Duane, The New Federal Rules of Evidence on Prior Acts of Accused 
Sex Offenders: A Poorly Drafted Version of a Very Bad Idea, 157 F.R.D. 95, 108–10 (1994); James 
S. Liebman, Proposed Evidence Rules 413 to 415—Some Problems and Recommendations, 20 U. 
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short, if the rationale for the rape sword rule is that the sexual history of de-
fendants is probative of propensity, then past acts should also be admissible 
against defendants charged with other types of crime.  They are not. 
3. Good Women: You’ve Come a Long Way, Baby146 
Lastly, there is a larger consequence to these reforms.  It is not just that 
rape reforms have tipped the scales in favor of guilt.  Nor is it that rape reforms 
in fact tip the scales twice, first in favor of complainants with Rule 412, then 
against defendants with Rule 413.  It is that the entire trial process has been 
reframed.  No longer are rape trials framed as pitting bad women against good 
men.  Now, the revised frame is one that purports to pit good women against 
bad men.147 
Evidence of a complainant’s sexual background—once admissible to show 
consent or impugn her credibility—is, for the most parts, off limits.  Con-
versely, the cloak of innocence that defendants once enjoyed—a byproduct of 
the general ban on propensity or character evidence to show bad character—is 
now a transparent cloak when it comes to defendants accused of sexual assault; 
  
DAYTON L. REV. 753, 755–57 (1995); Mark A. Sheft, Federal Rule of Evidence 413: A Dangerous 
New Frontier, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 57 (1995); Erik D. Ojala, Note, Propensity Evidence 
Under Rule 413: The Need for Balance, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 947 (1999); see also Edward J. 
Imwinkelried, A Small Contribution to the Debate Over the Proposed Legislation Abolishing the 
Character Evidence Prohibition in Sex Offense Prosecutions, 44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1125, 1146–47 
(1993); Symposium, Perspectives on Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence 413–415, 22 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 265 (1995). 
146. “You’ve Come a Long Way, Baby” was both an advertising slogan and a frequent refrain of the 
early feminist movement.  See Reva B. Siegel, You’ve Come a Long Way, Baby: Rehnquist’s New 
Approach to Pregnancy Discrimination in Hibbs, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1871, 1872 (2006) (discussing 
the phrase). 
147. Aviva Orenstein makes a related point, suggesting that feminists should be wary of reforms that 
patronize “women by providing them increased ‘protection.’”  Aviva Orenstein, No Bad Men!: A 
Feminist Analysis of Character Evidence in Rape Trials, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 663, 692–95 (1998).  
Orenstein further suggests that Rule 413 “may be more paternalistic than feminist.”  Id. at 695.  
An additional critique is that Rule 413, which is predicated on the notion that rapists are recid-
ivists, reinforces the myth of the crazed rapist and as such might ultimately undermine efforts to 
call attention to nonrepeat acquaintance rape.  For more on this argument, see Christina E. Wells 
& Erin Elliott Motley, Reinforcing the Myth of the Crazed Rapist: A Feminist Critique of Recent 
Rape Legislation, 81 B.U. L. REV. 127, 173–80 (2001). 
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their sexual history, however unproven,148 is admissible to show propensity and 
bad character.149 
This transformation clearly disadvantages male defendants vis-à-vis female 
complainants.  But this transformation also disadvantages women, as I explain 
in Part III. 
III. REAL VICTIMS 
The problems discussed so far, while consequential, are at bottom problems 
at the margins.  Far more troubling are two other problems.  The first concerns 
the expressive message Rule 412 communicates, which is one that privileges, of 
all things, chastity.  The second concerns what happens when rape victims do 
not fit the traditional rape script, that set of ideas we have about what rape looks 
like, what rapists look like, and most importantly here, what rape victims look 
like.  In other words, what happens when there is expressive message failure.  Both 
these concerns are addressed below. 
A. The Rape Shield’s Expressive Message 
The first problem with rape shield laws has existed since these laws were 
enacted but has gone unnoticed and unremarked on: In pushing for rape shield 
laws, rape shield proponents have in fact reinscribed the very chastity require-
ment they hoped to abolish.  This becomes readily apparent when one consid-
ers the expressive message communicated by rape shield laws. 
  
148. Under the Huddleston standard, such evidence would be admissible so long as the judge con-
cludes that there is sufficient evidence to support a jury finding by the preponderance of the evi-
dence that the defendant committed the prior act.  See Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681 
(1988); see also FED. R. EVID. 104(b). 
149. This change is particularly troubling in stranger rape cases in which identity is at issue.  In fact, 
the issue of misidentification is particularly acute in sexual assault cases, where about 84 percent of 
exonerees convicted based on misidentification were convicted of rape.  See BRANDON L. 
GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS GO 
WRONG 51 (2011).  In the absence of DNA evidence, such cases usually begin with the police 
showing the victim photo arrays of potential perpetrators—that is, of men who have prior arrests 
for sexual assault crimes.  The victim who identifies one of these men will likely find that her 
chances of securing a conviction at trial have been enhanced, even if the defendant in fact is the 
wrong man.  This is because in a jurisdiction applying a rape sword rule, his prior arrests will be 
admissible, in effect recasting him as guilty enough to be the right man in the eyes of the jurors.  
In other words, jurors who are reluctant to convict when presented with an eyewitness identi-
fication, and identification is contested, will be more likely to convict when the eyewitness iden-
tification is coupled with information that the suspect has a prior sexual history.  At least one 
other scholar has raised similar concerns.  See Duane, supra note 145. 
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Scholars have long stressed the importance of attending to law’s expres-
sive message.150  As Lawrence Lessig observed more than a decade ago, laws are 
anything but value neutral.151  They prescribe what behavior is inappropriate, 
what behavior is orthodox, and what behavior should be rewarded.152  More im-
portantly, law informs and shapes social mores in ways that are often subtle.  
This is especially true when it comes to criminal laws.153  As I have noted in 
another context: 
The criminal law expressively communicates which homes are ap-
propriate.  Stable, monogamous, heterosexual, married homes exist 
not outside of the criminal law, but under the aegis of it.  The crim-
inal law shapes norms.  It marks illicit conduct of which it dis-
approves.  It also indirectly marks other conduct as licit.  For example, 
a law that criminalizes same-sex sex almost by definition gives its 
imprimatur to heterosexual sex, contributing to what Adrienne Rich 
long ago termed “compulsory heterosexuality.”  A law that penalizes 
adultery not only condemns sex outside of marriage, but concom-
itantly privileges sexual fidelity within marriage.  A rule that protects 
marital communications and insulates spouses from compelled testi-
mony in criminal cases by definition deems other intimate rela-
tionships as less worthy of societal protection.  In short, the criminal 
law has always played favorites, both outside of the home and inside 
the home.154 
Let me add that while laws, especially those relating to criminal law, are 
necessarily expressive and value laden, the social meaning expressed by any 
particular law is not necessarily static.155 
Now consider two expressive messages communicated by rape shield laws.  
On one level, rape shield laws communicate that a complainant’s sexual history 
  
150. See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General 
Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503 (2000); I. Bennett Capers, Policing, Race, and Place, 44 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 43 (2009); Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 943 (1995); Richard H. McAdams & Janice Nadler, Coordinating in the Shadow of 
the Law: Two Contextualized Tests of the Focal Point Theory of Legal Compliance, 42 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 865 (2008); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. 
REV. 2021 (1996). 
151. See Lessig, supra note 150, at 957, 1044. 
152. See id. at 946–47. 
153. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413, 419 (1999). 
154. I. Bennett Capers, Home Is Where the Crime Is, 109 MICH. L. REV. 979, 988 (2011) (footnotes 
omitted) (reviewing JEANNIE SUK, AT HOME IN THE LAW: HOW THE DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE REVOLUTION IS TRANSFORMING PRIVACY (2009)). 
155. A law’s expressive meaning can change and can be multivalent.  Most importantly, it can be con-
tingent. 
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with other individuals is irrelevant to the issue presented in a standard rape 
trial—that is, whether she consented on this occasion.  On this level, rape shield 
laws communicate that sex does not matter, a sentiment that many advocates of 
rape shield laws would support.  But rape shield laws also communicate the 
opposite.  At the same time that rape shield laws purport to communicate that 
sexual history does not matter, such laws also communicate that sexual history 
does matter.  In fact, rape shield laws communicate that sexual history matters 
so much that it must be concealed, corseted, and locked away.  Put differently, 
removing sexual history from the courtroom does more than simply render sex-
ual history irrelevant.  It privileges chastity, or something like chastity.  Indeed, 
by pushing for rape shield laws, feminists have inadvertently legitimized the very 
chastity requirement they found so troubling. 
To be clear, my concern is not with the expressive message communicated 
to defendants, or to prosecutors and defenses lawyers, or even to victims, though 
how they receive this message is important.  Rather, my more pressing concern 
is with the expressive message sent to jurors.  The message to jurors sitting on 
rape trials is that they should assume that the complainant is a virgin, or if not a 
virgin, at least a good girl deserving of the law’s protection. 
To make my point clearer, a thought exercise may be useful.  Imagine a jury 
in a sexual assault case.  Imagine too that the complainant is a young, attractive, 
white woman.  She is solidly middle class, well educated, and articulate.  In short, 
she is presentable to the jury.156  During the course of the trial, the jurors will be 
inundated with information and, when the complainant testifies, they will like-
ly learn her approximate age, whether she attended college, what she does for a 
living, and other background information157  By virtue of the rape shield, 
however, there will be no mention of her sexual experience, whether that expe-
rience is nil, includes one partner, or includes hundreds.  In the absence of this 
information, the jury is likely to assume that this apparently ideal victim is, sex-
ually speaking, a good girl.  Indeed, jurors may even contrast her with other rape 
victims they have heard about on the news who seem sexually immoderate and 
whose accusations did not result in convictions.158  They may contrast her with 
  
156. This description of an ideal juror comes in part from Tuerkheimer, supra note 12, at 1463 n.6.  It is 
also consistent with the factors Bryden and Lengnick have compiled regarding when rape reports 
are pursued to indictment and conviction.  See Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 4, at 1237–41. 
157. MAUET, supra note 125, at 96–97. 
158. For example, they may think of the accuser of in the Kobe Bryant case.  Shortly after her ac-
cusation, an image appeared in The Globe of the accuser provocatively dressed, and Bryant’s at-
torneys made known the complainant’s sexual relationships with two witnesses.  See Kobe Bryant’s 
Accuser: Did She Really Say No?, GLOBE, Oct. 31, 2003, at 1; Dahlia Lithwick, The Shield That 
Failed, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/08/08/opinion/08lithwick. 
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someone who is not middle class or who is supposedly less presentable.159  In other 
words, when jurors are told nothing, they do not assume “nothing.”160  Instead, 
they use the information they are provided, as well as the surface appearance of 
the complainant—does she look like a good girl or a bad girl?—to fill in the 
blank.161 
All this comes with a perverse result.  Rather than disrupting the chastity 
requirement, rape shield laws in fact codify the requirement, entrenching it fur-
ther, and without any diminution in the costs.162  All this plays into antiquated 
  
html.  Or they may think of the accuser in the Duke Lacrosse case, who worked as a stripper and 
whose accusations did not result in a conviction.  See Susan Hanely Kosse, Race, Riches & Reporters—
Do Race and Class Impact Media Rape Narratives? An Analysis of the Duke Lacrosse Case, 31 S. ILL. 
U. L.J. 243 (2007). 
159. Our history of thinking that women of lower classes are more sexual and thus less likely to be real 
victims of rape is a long one.  In the nineteenth century, it was not uncommon to assume that girls 
and women of the working classes were, because of their environment, “thoroughly conversant 
with the sexual life in its most bestial manifestations,” and as such were fully capable of defending 
themselves.  WILLIAM ADRIAN BONGER, CRIMINALITY AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS 
618 (Henry P. Horton trans., Agathon Press 1967) (1916).  As Joanna Bourke has observed, 
“Since it was impossible for one man to rape a (working-class) woman, any women from the lower 
classes who dared claim to have been assaulted was patently lying.”  BOURKE, supra note 2, at 
27.  It is telling that in the high-profile rape cases, the attacks on complainants include class 
elements.  In the Kobe Bryant rape case, a commentator referred to his accuser as no more than 
a “mountain trash slut.”  See Andrew Billen, The Savage Voice of an Angry America, TIMES (T2) 
(London), Sept. 2, 2003, http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/life/article1717623.ece (describing 
conservative radio host Michael Savage’s characterization of the complainant and his 
admonition to his six million listeners to refer to her as “Rocky Mountain Trash”).  The 
complainant in the Duke Lacrosse case became a low-class “ho” and “crypto-hooker.”  Kosse, 
supra note 158, at 259, 268–70, 272; Transcript of “The Situation With Tucker Carlson” for 
April 11, 2006, MSNBC (Apr. 12, 2006, 11:54 AM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/1 
2285620/ns/msnbc-the_ed_show/t/situation-tucker-carlson-april (quoting Tucker Carlson). 
160. Ronald Allen and Larry Laudan make an analogous observation about the exclusion of criminal his-
tory evidence in criminal cases.  Normally, courts exclude evidence of a defendant’s criminal 
history.  It appears that when this information is withheld from jurors, however, they fill in the 
blank, assuming that certain defendants have a criminal history and that other defendants do not.  
See Larry Laudan & Ronald J. Allen, The Devastating Impact of Prior Crimes Evidence and Other 
Myths of the Criminal Justice Process, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 493, 508–11 (2011).  
Although Allen and Laudan did not examine what role the race of the defendant played in jurors’ 
assumptions about which defendants in fact had criminal histories, given the implicit biases most 
individuals have about race and criminality, it seems likely that one factor jurors consider is race.  
See Justin D. Levinson et al., Guilty by Implicit Racial Bias: The Guilty/Non Guilty Implicit Association 
Test, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 187, 204 (2010).  Sociologist Devah Pager’s work using testers to 
measure employment discrimination is useful here, since her work suggests that employers often 
use race as a proxy for criminality.  DEVAH PAGER, MARKED: RACE, CRIME, AND FINDING 
WORK IN AN ERA OF MASS INCARCERATION 93–96 (2007).  In other words, jurors may 
engage in a type of racial profiling. 
161. For a discussion of how individuals use surface appearances, see I. Bennett Capers, Cross 
Dressing and the Criminal, 20 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 11 (2008). 
162. Even the rape shield law’s exception for sexual history evidence between the complainant and the 
accused buys into this good girl trope.  Because the exception is so limited, any sexual history evi-
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notions that a woman who is not a virgin or who has had sex outside of mar-
riage is damaged goods and is less worthy of the law’s protection.  Rape shield 
law’s contribution to the feminist agenda is not the subversion of the law’s pref-
erence for good girls but rather a sleight of hand that unilaterally transforms all 
women, in theory at least, into virgins (or at least good girls).  The complainant, 
by virtue of the rape shield laws, becomes a woman without a sexual past—a 
virtual virgin, a virgin anew, or at least a good girl anew. 
Put differently, prior to the widespread passage of rape shield laws in the 
late 1970s, a combination of substantive law requirements and evidentiary rules 
effectively limited rape law’s protection to women who were demonstrably good.  
As such, only a subset of women was protected.  Rather than challenging this 
privileging of chastity, the primary effect of rape shield laws has been to allow 
more women to pass as good women.  Instead of women being divided into 
good women and bad women, the rape shield laws allow all women, at least in 
theory, to seem facially good and thus deserving of the law’s protection. 
But this shift is not cost free.  Even assuming that concealing sexual 
history benefits rape victims in toto—an assumption I call into question below—
feminists should be deeply troubled by a message that, in effect if not intent, 
reinscribes the chastity requirement.  As Anita Allen observed in critiquing tra-
ditional expectations about appropriate female behavior, “Conventions of fe-
male chastity and modesty have shielded women in a mantle of privacy at a high 
cost to sexual choice and self-expression.”163  If the goal is gender equality and 
sexual autonomy, then we must recognize that rape shield laws have the perverse 
effect of frustrating this goal by indirectly privileging female chastity.164  We 
must recognize too that rather than furthering sexual liberty, rape shield laws, 
through their expressive message and concealment of consensual sex, contrib-
ute to what scholars have identified as a “sex-negative” regulatory regime.165  
Michelle Anderson put it this way: 
  
dence is at least consistent with monogamy.  The message to jurors, even under this exception, is 
that they should assume the defendant is the only person the accused has had sex with. 
163. Anita L. Allen, Taking Liberties: Privacy, Private Choice, and Social Contract Theory, 56 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 461, 471 (1987). 
164. Aya Gruber and Cristina Tilley have made similar points.  See Gruber, supra note 8, at 637 (“Such 
a [prejudiced] justification [for rape shield laws] supports rather than counters the view that fe-
male sexuality should be kept secret and even condemned.”); Tilley, supra note 66, at 77–80. 
165. For a discussion of the “sex-negative landscape” that currently exists in American law and the ar-
gument that the state should “independently protect both intimate relationships and sexual in-
teractions because sex can constitute a vital part of individual identity and self-expression even 
when not channeled into intimacy,” see Laura A. Rosenbury & Jennifer E. Rothman, Sex in and 
out of Intimacy, 59 EMORY L.J. 809, 811 (2010).  For additional arguments in support of 
reclaiming a right to sexual liberty, see Melissa Murray, Marriage as Punishment, 112 COLUM. 
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Supporters of rape shield laws did not set out to defend the idea 
that women should be free to engage in whatever kind of consensual 
sexual behavior they chose, publicly or privately, without having that 
behavior haunt them if they were raped.  It was safer to protect those 
women who had previously had sex only monogamously with their 
boyfriends or husbands in private.  Instead of championing women’s 
sexual autonomy, drafters concentrated on how degrading and 
embarrassing it was for women to have to discuss publicly their pri-
vate sexual affairs.166 
We are living with that choice now.  That is one problem.  Another is the loss 
of real women.  Instead of trials with real women, rape shield rules dictate trials 
with cardboard cutouts of women—trials in which women are in effect required 
to hide their sexual selves and don a cloak of chastity, or something like it.  None 
of this can be good for those of us who care about female agency or about artic-
ulating the subject position of women.  And none of this can be good for ad-
dressing the real problem of rape. 
B. Expressive Message Failure 
There is a related problem with rape shield laws.  However, this problem 
tugs in the opposite direction and occurs when there is expressive message 
failure.  Put differently, the problem here is when jurors reject the good girl mes-
sage communicated by rape shield laws.167  While one normative message of 
rape shield laws is that all rape victims should be treated as good girls and thus 
deserving of the law’s protection, jurors are likely to reject this message if it con-
flicts with our implicit biases168 and preexisting rape scripts.  To better un-
  
L. REV. 1, 62–64 (2012).  Several scholars, from the perspective of gay rights, have also argued 
for more sexual liberty.  See, e.g., Libby Adler, The Dignity of Sex, 17 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 
16–19 (2008); Katherine M. Franke, The Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v. Texas, 104 
COLUM. L. REV. 1399, 1400–04 (2004); cf. I. Bennett Capers, Enron, DOMA, and Spousal 
Privileges: Rethinking the Marriage Plot, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 715 (2012); Bernard E. 
Harcourt, Foreword: “You Are Entering a Gay and Lesbian Free Zone”: On the Radical Dissent of 
Justice Scalia and Other (Post-) Queers [Raising Questions About Lawrence, Sex Wars, and the 
Criminal Law], 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 503 (2004). 
166. Anderson, supra note 5, at 94 (footnote omitted). 
167. For a discussion of how the cultural background and assumptions of jurors have a stronger effect 
than legal definitions in rape cases, see generally Dan M. Kahan, Culture, Cognition, and Consent: 
Who Perceives What, and Why, in Acquaintance-Rape Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 729 (2010).  
Aviva Orenstein makes a similar point.  See Orenstein, supra note 8, at 1590 (“[C]ultural prej-
udices concerning the nature of rape, the rapist, and his rape victim are inescapable at trial.”). 
168. Using implicit association tests (IATs), which measure the speed with which an individual as-
sociates a categorical status with a characteristic, social-cognition researchers have shown that 
implicit biases are common.  The legal literature on implicit biases is rich.  See generally Samuel 
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derstand this point, some discussion of narrative theory in juror decisionmaking 
in general, and rape trials in particular, is useful.169  Also useful is some discus-
sion of how black women have historically fitted, or rather not fitted, into the 
general rape script, and the recent phenomenon of Slutwalks. 
1. Narrative Theory and Rape Scripts 
While the general view is that jurors and other factfinders decide what 
really happened by considering all the evidence, engaging in deductive reason-
ing, and making probability assessments,170 more recent scholarship makes 
clear that this rationalist perspective of factfinding is incomplete.171  In fact, ex-
periential research makes clear that factfinders only partially weigh probabilities 
when deciding what really happened.172  Even more critical to factfinders is 
whether the information they are provided can be assembled into a plausible, 
teleological narrative.173  In Andrew Taslitz’s discussion of narratives in the 
courtroom, he observed: 
[J]ury reasoning is story-based.  Juries convert evidence into familiar 
stories, filling in gaps in the evidence where needed to craft a coher-
  
R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1 
(2006) (arguing for a structural approach to employment discrimination law to resolve uncon-
scious bias and its resulting inequalities in the workplace); Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the 
Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124 (2012) (using a scientific approach to analyze the implicit 
bias in the courtroom of a criminal trial and a civil trial); Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 
HARV. L. REV. 1489 (2005) (exploring scientific findings that most people have implicit biases 
against racial minorities and examining the origins of these biases); L. Song Richardson, Arrest 
Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 95 MINN. L. REV. 2035 (2011) (arguing that in the 
context of the Fourth Amendment, courts should embrace a behavioral realistic framework to 
reconsider their assumptions about police decisionmaking in stop-and-frisk situations). 
169. Although the discussion focuses on juror decisionmaking at trial, narrative theory applies equally, 
albeit with some modification, to all decisionmakers: from police officers deciding whether to declare 
a rape allegation founded or unfounded, to prosecutors determining what if any charges to file, to 
judges’ decisions about appropriate punishment.  For examples of how narratives about race may 
play into prosecutors’ decisionmaking, see generally Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The 
Power and Privilege of Discretion, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 13 (1998). 
170. See, e.g., 5 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 17 (1827) (“If there be 
one business that belongs to a jury . . . , it is, one should think, the judging of the probability of 
evidence . . . .”); Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 
366 (1978) (discussing rationality as a basis of decisionmaking); George F. James, Relevancy, 
Probability, and the Law, 29 CALIF. L. REV. 689 (1941). 
171. See, e.g., Lisa Kern Griffin, Narrative, Truth, and Trial, 101 GEO. L.J. 281 (2013). 
172. Id. at 294; see also Dan Simon, A Third View of the Black Box: Cognitive Coherence in Legal Decision 
Making, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 511, 513 (2004) (“[T]here are deep incompatibilities between actual 
legal decision making and the primarily Rationalist assumptions on which trials are designed.”). 
173. Griffin, supra note 171, at 293; cf. Ronald J. Allen & Brian Leiter, Naturalized Epistemology and 
the Law of Evidence, 87 VA. L. REV. 1491 (2001). 
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ent tale.  Whom jurors believe turns on the consistency of each wit-
ness’s testimony with the plausible stories that juries create based upon 
their preexisting stock.  These stock stories come from experience and 
culture, tales learned from the Bible, children’s tales, television, radio, 
books, magazines, and movies.  Stories create our world of meaning; 
they are the lens through which we view all of life’s events.174 
For example, it is a fundamental precept of playwriting, courtesy of Anton 
Chekhov, that if a gun appears in Act One, it must be fired by Act Three to 
satisfy theater-goers’ expectations.175  Similar expectations exist at trial.  Indeed, 
the Supreme Court acknowledged this very point in the seminal evidence case 
Old Chief v. United States.176  Using an example that recalls Chekhov’s admon-
ishment, the Court stated the following: 
[T]here lies the need for evidence in all its particularity to satisfy the 
jurors’ expectations about what proper proof should be.  Some such 
demands they bring with them to the courthouse, assuming, for ex-
ample that a charge of using a firearm to commit an offense will be 
proven by introducing a gun in evidence.  A prosecutor who fails to 
produce one, or some good reason for his failure, has something to be 
concerned about.177 
This linkage between trials and storytelling, particularly in the form of 
theater, is not a new one.178  And indeed it makes sense.  To a large extent, the 
witnesses, the judge, and the lawyers are all performers in the drama.  Corey 
Rayburn Yung has observed that witnesses in particular must perform, even if 
the range of prewritten cultural scripts available to them is limited.179  It also 
makes sense to view jurors in particular as a type of audience.  How they receive 
the performance is important,180 but they judge it based on how they relate to it.  
  
174. ANDREW E. TASLITZ, RAPE AND THE CULTURE OF THE COURTROOM 7–8 (1999); see also 
Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision Making: The Story Model, 
13 CARDOZO L. REV. 519 (1991). 
175. Y. Sobolev, Tchekhov’s Creative Method, in ANTON TCHEKHOV: LITERARY AND THEATRICAL 
REMINISCENCES 3, 23 (S.S. Koteliansky ed. & trans., 1965); see also Alan M. Dershowitz, Life Is Not 
a Dramatic Narrative, in LAW’S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW 99, 99–100 
(Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996) (demonstrating how Chekhov’s precept could affect a jury 
in a hypothetical murder trial). 
176. 519 U.S. 172 (1997). 
177. Id. at 188. 
178. See, e.g., Milner S. Ball, The Play’s the Thing: An Unscientific Reflection on Courts Under the Rubric 
of Theater, 28 STAN. L. REV. 81 (1975). 
179. Corey Rayburn, To Catch a Sex Thief: The Burden of Performance in Rape and Sexual Assault Trials, 
15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 437, 437–38 (2006). 
180. Indeed, reception theory has particular importance here.  On reception theory, see generally STANLEY FISH, 
IS THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS?: THE AUTHORITY OF INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITIES 14 (1980) 
(exploring how the communities to which one belongs and interacts can affect how one interprets a text). 
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Did they believe the witness’s performance?  Did they judge the witness’s story 
plausible?  How do the stories told by the various witnesses cohere? 
Narrative theory has particular salience for rape cases.  For starters, often 
the only witnesses to the actual event are the accuser and the accused, allowing 
jurors more leeway to view the testimony against their preconceived scripts.  As 
Kalven and Zeisel observed nearly half a century ago in their oft-cited The 
American Jury,181 it is precisely in the hard cases with ambiguous evidence that 
jurors feel “liberated” from the constraints of evidence.182  Indeed, studies show 
that jurors rely on rape scripts in assessing witness credibility and determining 
“the truth,”183 and that jurors converge “on whatever stereotypic-consistent 
imagery and information is available to them.”184  This happens even in the face 
of jury instructions to consider only the admitted evidence.  “Even when the 
court fully shields the jury from particular evidence that the victim is ‘loose’ or 
lying, stereotypes and heuristics continue to operate.  Looking at it herme-
neutically, the rape trial proceeds on a backdrop of narratives surrounding all 
the players involved—from police, to defendants, to victims.”185 
Narrative theory also has salience precisely because it explains why rapes 
that fail to fit the perceived real-rape script remain difficult to prosecute, 
notwithstanding the numerous reforms to rape law.186  Patriarchal stories con-
tinue to inform “when and why [rape] happens, and to and by whom.”187  For 
example, because of this country’s particular racialized history, in which black 
men were stereotyped as perpetual sexual threats to white women, the imagined 
ideal rapist continues to be black, and the ideal rape victim is white and de-
mure.188  Factfinders are much more likely to find that a rape occurred when 
this particular black–white dyad is present, even when controlling for all other 
  
181. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 59. 
182. Id. at 165. 
183. See VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 204 (1986) (finding that jurors 
incorporate the public’s myths about rape). 
184. Douglas D. Koski, Jury Decisionmaking in Rape Trials: A Review & Empirical Assessment, 38 CRIM. 
L. BULL. 21, 128 (2002). 
185. Gruber, supra note 8, at 647 (footnote omitted); see also Ann Althouse, Thelma and Louise and 
the Law: Do Rape Shield Rules Matter?, 25 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 757, 764 (1992) (concluding that 
even when rape shield laws are applied, gendered narratives can enter the trial); Rayburn, supra note 
179, at 460–65 (discussing the important language and presentation choices that the accuser must 
make while taking into consideration jurors’ narratives in order to meet the burden of performance). 
186. SPOHN & HORNEY, supra note 6, at 155 (“[T]he benefits of rape law reform may have accrued 
primarily to victims of ‘stranger’ rapes.”). 
187. TASLITZ, supra note 174, at 8.  On the media’s role in perpetuating patriarchal and racialized 
narratives, see Joanne Ardovini-Brooker & Susan Caringella-MacDonald, Media Attributions of 
Blame and Sympathy in Ten Rape Cases, 15 JUST. PROF. 3 (2002), and Kosse, supra note 159. 
188. See sources cited supra note 7. 
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variables.189  Even the popular “Model Mugging” self-defense programs of the 
1970s and 1980s carried this undercurrent, encouraging their students, who 
were predominantly white, middle-class women, to be “immediately suspicious 
when they encounter a male of color on the street but not when they enter a 
fraternity party at a private university.”190  Because it does not fit as easily into an 
immediate rape script, factfinders are less likely to find that a rape occurred when 
the accuser and accused are both white and middle class. 
Patriarchal stories also shape assumptions “about the sexes’ similarities and 
differences, motivations and needs, strengths and weaknesses.”191  Summoning 
preexisting rape scripts, jurors are less likely to find that a rape occurred when 
the accuser’s behavior does not comport with their understanding of what they 
believe rape victims do.  For example, notwithstanding the relaxation and even 
elimination of the resistance requirement in many states, jurors continue to be 
skeptical in cases in which the accuser did not resist to their satisfaction.192  De-
cisionmakers also continue to be skeptical in cases in which there has not been 
prompt complaint.193  One way of understanding these acquittals is that jurors 
are relying on their understanding of how they believe people act, which in turn 
reflects their story-based ideas.194 
Most importantly, preexisting scripts about what rape victims look like 
may conflict with rape shield messages and thus result in factfinders applying a 
different default assumption in cases involving victims who do not fit the 
script.195  While young, demure, white women may fit easily into the stock type 
  
189. Capers, supra note 7, at 1360–62 (discussing multiple studies that demonstrate a large racial 
disparity in conviction and sentencing in rape cases). 
190. Shannon Jackson, Representing Rape: Model Mugging’s Discursive and Embodied Performance, 37 
DRAMA REV. 110, 126 (1993). 
191. TASLITZ, supra note 174, at 8. 
192. See generally KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 23, at 329 (noting that many courts and states 
still expect resistance).  For a discussion of resistance’s continued salience to decisionmakers, see 
Victoria Nourse, The “Normal” Successes and Failures of Feminism and the Criminal Law, 75 CHI-
KENT L. REV. 951, 956–57 (2000). 
193. Michelle J. Anderson, Women Do Not Report the Violence They Suffer: Violence Against Women and 
the State Action Doctrine, 46 VILL. L. REV. 907, 937 (2001). 
194. There is also the separate issue of the mode of storytelling in court, which may disadvantage wo-
men in general.  See Kim Lane Scheppele, Just the Facts Ma’am: Sexualized Violence, Evidentiary 
Habits, and the Revision of Truth, 37 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 123 (1992). 
195. A similar phenomenon occurred before the advent of rape shield laws.  As Kalven and Zeisel noted in 
their study of jury behavior, jurors routinely “penalized” complainants who did not fit the stereotype of the 
good woman.  KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 59, at 251.  They concluded that jurors, in effect, 
“rewrit[e] the law of rape” when they believe the accuser is undeserving of the law’s protection.  Id. 
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of the victim, the damsel in distress, or the good girl,196 and thus receive some197 
benefit from rape shield’s protections,198 women who do not fit this description 
are likely to find jurors applying different default assumptions.  In short, the 
stock characters are different.  While this is true for a variety of women—jurors 
in a case involving an Asian complainant may view her as “exotically sexual 
[and] willingly submissive,”199 while jurors in a case involving a Hispanic woman 
may view her as hot blooded, “wanton and promiscuous”200—I discuss black 
women at length because our law’s history of treating black women as negligible 
is so long.201  There is another reason why the situation of black women merits 
particular discussion.  Notwithstanding their near invisibility in public imag-
  
196. See supra note 8; see also BELL HOOKS, AIN’T I A WOMAN: BLACK WOMEN AND FEMINISM 31 (1981) 
(describing how men in the nineteenth century imposed a “glorified de-sexualized identity” on white women 
in contrast to the previous perception of white women as sinners consumed by sexuality). 
197. Even this benefit is compromised.  As demonstrated in Part III.A, rape shields require women 
to downplay and even conceal their sexuality.  Rape shields also convey a message that is sex neg-
ative rather than sex positive, or even sex neutral.  To illustrate what I mean by this, imagine a con-
versation between a prosecutor and a rape victim who does not fit the ideal victim script.  Imagine, 
for example, that the complainant arrives for trial preparation at the prosecutor’s office dressed in 
“tight blue jeans.  Very tight.  With a see-through blouse on top.  Very revealing.”  SUSAN ESTRICH, 
REAL RAPE 9 (1987).  This is in fact the description Susan Estrich uses for a bad victim.  Id.  
The conversation may very well go like this: 
PROSECUTOR: So don’t take this the wrong way, but I’d like you to wear 
something more conservative for trial. 
COMPLAINANT: Why?  This is how I dress. 
PROSECUTOR: Because.  And another thing.  Don’t mention that you live with 
your boyfriend. 
COMPLAINANT: But he’s a part of my life. 
PROSECUTOR: Or that you occasionally stop at a bar on Friday nights. 
COMPLAINANT: What?  Am I supposed to act like I stay at home all the time? 
PROSECUTOR: It depends.  Do you want this guy to pay for what he did to you 
or not? 
As a former prosecutor for nearly decade, I can attest to the lengths to which prosecutors go to present their 
witnesses in the most positive light.  In short, prosecutors often pigeonhole rape victims into a perceived 
acceptable type and require them to perform.  Several scholars have commented on this phenomenon.  See, 
e.g., Capers, supra note 161, at 12; Amanda Konradi, Too Little, Too Late: Prosecutors’ Pre-court Preparation of 
Rape Survivors, 22 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1, 27–28 (1997); Rayburn, supra note 179. 
198. See, e.g., Linda L. Ammons, Mules, Madonnas, Babies, Bathwater, Racial Imagery and Stereotypes: The African-
American Woman and the Battered Woman Syndrome, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 1003, 1041 (“White women have 
been deemed good women as long as they stay within the prescribed limits of their proper roles.”). 
199. Lisa C. Ikemoto, Male Fraud, 3 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 511, 518–19 (2000).  For more on the enduring 
image of the servile, sexually available Asian woman, see EDWARD W. SAID, ORIENTALISM 180–90 (1978). 
200. Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Ignoring the Sexualization of Race: Heteronormativity, Critical Race Theory 
and Anti-racist Politics, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 89 (1999); see also Maria L. Ontiveros, Three Perspectives 
on Workplace Harassment of Women of Color, 23 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 817, 820 (1993). 
201. See Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence 
Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1266–69 (1991); Harris, supra note 7, at 598–
99; Roberts, supra note 7, at 364–69; Wriggins, supra note 81; Gail Elizabeth Wyatt, The Sociocultural 
Context of African American and White American Women’s Rape, 48 J. SOC. ISSUES 77 (1992). 
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ination about rape,202 black women in fact face higher rape victimization rates 
than white women.203 
2. Rape Scripts, Black Women, and Slutwalks 
The association of black women with sexual accessibility has a long his-
tory, from the assumption of twelfth-century travelers to Africa that naked-
ness signified concupiscence,204 to the legally sanctioned accessibility to black 
women during American slavery,205 to the ostensibly scientific belief common 
during the 1800s that black women possessed a primitive sexual appetite and 
primitive genitalia.206  In short, black women were marked as naturally pro-
miscuous,207 having less need or desire for foreplay than white women, and gen-
erally less discriminating in their choice of sexual partners.208 
  
202. The Central Park jogger case, which involved a white victim, is but one example.  The case 
dominated the media for months.  In fact, there were 3,254 other reported rapes that year, “including 
one the following week involving the near decapitation of a black woman in Fort Tryon Park and one 
two weeks later involving a black woman in Brooklyn who was robbed, raped, sodomized, and thrown 
down an air shaft of a four-story building.”  JOAN DIDION, AFTER HENRY 255 (1992).  These rapes 
of women of color, however, were simply not newsworthy.  As I wrote several years ago, it is relatively 
easy to summon the images of white female victims.  I. Bennett Capers, Crime, Legitimacy, and Testilying, 
83 IND. L.J. 835, 855–56 (2008).  And I noted then, “It is perhaps telling that the black females who 
come to mind are Tawana Brawley and the accuser in the Duke Lacrosse team rape case, both fa-
mously discredited as non-victims.”  Id. at 856 n.115.  Now, another supposed nonvictim could be 
added to the list: the accuser in the Dominique Strauss-Kahn case.  See infra notes 292–306. 
203. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 235508, CRIMINAL 
VICTIMIZATION, 2010, at 11 (2011). 
204. See, e.g., THE ITINERARY OF BENJAMIN OF TUDELA 68 (Marcus Nathan Adler ed. & trans., 1907). 
205. It was understood, for example, that the laws against rape did not prohibit the rape of black slaves, or 
for that matter, slave children.  See Capers, supra note 7, at 1357; see also Sharon Block, Lines of Color, 
Sex, and Service: Comparative Sexual Coercion in Early America, in SEX, LOVE, RACE: CROSSING 
BOUNDARIES IN NORTH AMERICAN HISTORY 141, 141 (Martha Hodes ed., 1999); Catherine 
Clinton, “With a Whip in His Hand”: Rape, Memory, and African-American Women, in HISTORY AND 
MEMORY IN AFRICAN-AMERICAN CULTURE 205, 206–07 (Geneviève Fabre & Robert O’Meally 
eds., 1994). 
206. Sander L. Gilman, Black Bodies, White Bodies: Toward an Iconography of Female Sexuality in Late 
Nineteenth-Century Art, Medicine, and Literature, in “RACE,” WRITING, AND DIFFERENCE 223, 
231–38 (Henry Louis Gates, Jr. ed., 1986). 
207. See, e.g., Adele Logan Alexander, “She’s No Lady, She’s a Nigger”: Abuses, Stereotypes, and Realities From 
the Middle Passage to Capitol (and Anita) Hill, in RACE, GENDER, AND POWER IN AMERICA: THE 
LEGACY OF THE HILL-THOMAS HEARINGS 3, 7 (Anita Faye Hill & Emma Coleman Jordan eds., 
1995); see also A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., The Hill-Thomas Hearings—What Took Place and What 
Happened: White Male Domination, Black Male Domination, and the Denigration of Black Women, in 
RACE, GENDER, AND POWER IN AMERICA, supra, at 26, 32  (noting that in the 1800s, black female 
slaves were presumed to lack “moral virtue” and thus “it was not within their nature to be raped”). 
208. See William H. George & Lorraine J. Martínez, Victim Blaming in Rape: Effects of Victim and 
Perpetrator Race, Type of Rape, and Participant Racism, 26 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 110, 110 (2002). 
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All this has had consequences when it comes to the sexual victimization of 
black women.  Notwithstanding the black letter law that, after the Reconstruction 
Amendments, notionally treated all rape victims equally, a type of “white letter 
law of rape”209 remained that categorized black women as presumptively un-
chaste.210  Thus, in 1918, the Florida Supreme Court could remark with con-
fidence that  
[w]hat has been said by some courts about an unchaste female . . . 
being a comparatively rare exception is no doubt true where the pop-
ulation is composed largely of the Caucasian race, but we would blind 
ourselves to actual conditions if we adopted this rule where another 
race that is largely unmoral constitutes an appreciable part of the 
population.211 
Since lack of chastity also signified untrustworthiness, black women were also 
deemed less credible than white women.212  As a result, black women were often 
viewed as “unrapeable”213 or responsible for their own rapes.214 
While much more empirical work needs to be done on the continuing sa-
lience of these assumptions, the studies that do exist suggest that stereotypes about 
black women and their sexuality continue to affect juror decisionmaking.  Con-
sider Gary LaFree’s oft-cited study of juror attitudes.215  Controlling for other 
  
209. I first introduced the concept “white letter law” in two earlier articles.  See Capers, supra note 79, at 19; 
I. Bennett Capers, The Trial of Bigger Thomas: Race, Gender, and Trespass, 31 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 1, 7–8 (2006).  Unlike black letter law, which brings to mind statutory law, written law, and 
the easily discernible law set forth as black letters on a white page, “white letter law” suggests societal 
and normative laws that stand side by side with and often undergird black letter law but, as if inscribed 
in white ink on white paper, remain invisible to the naked eye. 
210. Anderson, supra note 5, at 66–68; Dorothy E. Roberts, Unshackling Black Motherhood, 95 MICH. 
L. REV. 938, 950 (1997); Joan R. Tarpley, Blackwomen, Sexual Myth, and Jurisprudence, 69 TEMP. L. 
REV. 1343, 1365 (1996); Sarah Gill, Essay, Dismantling Gender and Race Stereotypes: Using Education 
to Prevent Date Rape, 7 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 27, 36–37 (1996). 
211. Dallas v. State, 79 So. 690, 691 (Fla. 1918). 
212. See Hutchinson, supra note 200, at 85 (“[T]he construction of black women as promiscuous 
causes jurors in sexual assault prosecutions to doubt black women’s credibility.”); see also Gill, supra 
note 210, at 36.  For more on this phenomenon, see Marilyn Yarbrough with Crystal Bennett, 
Cassandra and the “Sistahs”: The Peculiar Treatment of African American Women in the Myth of Women 
as Liars, 3 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 625 (2000). 
213. See Capers, supra note 7, at 1368; see also CAROLINE A. FORELL & DONNA M. MATTHEWS, A 
LAW OF HER OWN: THE REASONABLE WOMAN AS A MEASURE OF MAN 229 (2000); Sharon 
Angella Allard, Essay, Rethinking Battered Woman Syndrome: A Black Feminist Perspective, 1 UCLA 
WOMEN’S L.J. 191, 196 & n.16, 199, 201–02 (1991); Darci E. Burrell, Recent Developments, 
Myth, Stereotype, and the Rape of Black Women, 4 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 87, 89 (1993). 
214. Paula Giddings, The Last Taboo, in WORDS OF FIRE: AN ANTHOLOGY OF AFRICAN-
AMERICAN FEMINIST THOUGHT 414, 415 (Beverly Guy-Sheftall ed., 1995). 
215. Gary D. LaFree et al., Jurors’ Responses to Victims’ Behavior and Legal Issues in Sexual Assault 
Trials, 32 SOC. PROBS. 389 (1985). 
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factors, LaFree concluded that jurors were less likely to render a guilty verdict 
when the accuser was a black woman.216  Discussing the results, LaFree spec-
ulated that perhaps “jurors were influenced by stereotypes of black women as 
more likely to consent to sex or as more sexually experienced and, hence, less 
harmed by an assault.”217  As a juror in one case put it, a “girl her age from ‘that 
kind of neighborhood’ probably wasn’t a virgin anyway.”218  Other studies have 
found similar results.219 
A survey taken in response to the case of Joan Little, a black female pris-
oner who was prosecuted for killing her jailer, is likewise informative.  Little 
claimed that she killed the jailer to defend herself from rape.220  In connection 
with her defense, social scientists conducted a survey of racial and gender atti-
tudes in the county where she was scheduled to be tried.  In an attempt to gauge 
how jurors would respond to her rape allegation, the survey asked, “Do you be-
lieve that black women have lower morals than white women?”  Sixty-three 
percent of the individuals surveyed answered yes.221 
These assumptions about black women and lack of chastity even make ap-
pearances in popular culture.  Lyrics from the Rolling Stones song “Some Girls” 
are but one example: 
White girls they’re pretty funny 
Sometimes they drive me mad, 
  
216. Id. at 397. 
217. Id. at 401–02. 
218. Id. at 402 n.22. 
219. A study of the treatment of female victims of sexual assault in Australia, with a particular focus on 
the subset of cases involving black and Aboriginal women, reached a similar finding.  Anne 
Cossins, Saints, Sluts and Sexual Assault: Rethinking the Relationship Between Sex, Race and 
Gender, 12 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 77 (2003).  Another scholar observes, “Racialized and mar-
ginalized women, who are less valued and less credible in a society characterized by racism, are, 
by definition, less readily identified as ‘ideal victims’ and more easily stigmatized as ‘bad’ or 
‘undeserving’ victims (if their victim claims are heard at all).”  Melanie Randall, Sexual Assault 
Law, Credibility, and “Ideal Victims”: Consent, Resistance, and Victim Blaming, 22 CAN. J. 
WOMEN & L. 397, 410 (2010).  The race of the victim also appears to play a role in pros-
ecutorial decisions about whether even to pursue charges.  See, e.g., Cassia Spohn et al., 
Prosecutorial Justifications for Sexual Assault Case Rejection: Guarding the “Gateway to Justice,” 48 
SOC. PROBS. 206, 226 (2001) (“[P]rosecutors rejected charges more often if the victim was a 
racial minority . . . .”); see also Cassia Spohn & David Holleran, Prosecuting Sexual Assault: A 
Comparison of Charging Decisions in Sexual Assault Cases Involving Strangers, Acquaintances, and 
Intimate Partners, 18 JUST. Q. 651, 671 (2001) (finding that “prosecutors were 4 ½ times more 
likely to file charges if the victim was white” than if the victim was black).  For a discussion of 
these and similar studies, see Jeffrey J. Pokorak, Rape as a Badge of Slavery: The Legal History of, 
and Remedies for, Prosecutorial Race-of-Victim Charging Disparities, 7 NEV. L.J. 1, 37–43 (2006). 
220. See W. LANCE BENNETT & MARTHA S. FELDMAN, RECONSTRUCTING REALITY IN THE 
COURTROOM: JUSTICE AND JUDGMENT IN AMERICAN CULTURE 180 (1981). 
221. Id. 
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Black girls just want to get fucked all night 
I just don’t have that much jam.222 
All this suggests that rape shield’s claimed benefit may vary depending on 
the race of the complainant and that women of color are less likely than white 
women to benefit from rape shield laws.   
Again, a thought exercise may be useful.  Imagine a jury in a sexual assault 
case.  This complainant, however, is a black woman.  During the course of the 
trial, the jurors will be inundated with information, and they will likely learn 
where she lives (which, statistically speaking, is likely to be a majority black 
neighborhood),223 whether she attended college (which, statistically speaking, is 
unlikely),224 and what she does for a living (which, statically speaking, is likely 
to be a low-wage job).225  By virtue of the rape shield, jurors will learn nothing 
about her sexual experience.  But again, jurors who are told nothing do not as-
sume nothing.  Instead, jurors are more apt to conclude that the complainant is 
sexually active and that she may even be a bad girl (sexually indiscriminate and sex-
ually immoderate).  Indeed, because of the continued salience of race in this 
country, jurors may reach this conclusion even when presented with a black com-
plainant who is solidly middle-class, articulate, and fully presentable to the jury. 
All this should suggest that the push for rape shield laws in the 1970s 
warrants further scrutiny.  Agitators for change were largely monolithic,226 and 
they achieved a result that disproportionately benefits white women.227  Moreover, 
  
222. ROLLING STONES, SOME GIRLS (Rolling Stone Records 1978). 
223. JOHN ICELAND ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, RACIAL AND ETHNIC RESIDENTIAL 
SEGREGATION IN THE UNITED STATES: 1980–2000, at 4 (2002); see also Ilyce Glink, U.S. 
Housing Market Remains Deeply Segregated, CBSNEWS.COM (June 20, 2012, 7:10 AM), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-505145_162-57443862/u.s-housing-market-remains-deeply-
segregated. 
224. See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, THE AFRICAN-AMERICAN LABOR FORCE IN THE RECOVERY 1 (2012), 
http://www.dol.gov/_sec/media/reports/BlackLaborForce/BlackLaborForce.pdf. 
225. Id. at 1–2. 
226. For a discussion of the lack of diversity in most second-wave feminist groups and the failure of 
antirape activists to address racial issues, see ANGELA Y. DAVIS, WOMEN, RACE AND CLASS 
(First Vintage Books 1983) (1981), and HOOKS, supra note 196.  For a more in-depth discussion 
exploring the inclusion of black women in antirape campaigns in some cities, such as Washington, 
D.C., but their exclusion elsewhere, see Maria Bevacqua, Anti-rape Coalitions: Radical, Liberal, 
Black, and White Feminists Challenging Boundaries, in FORGING RADICAL ALLIANCES ACROSS 
DIFFERENCE: COALITION POLITICS FOR THE NEW MILLENNIUM 163 (Jill M. Bystydzienski 
& Steven P. Schacht eds., 2001). 
227. As Lynn Hecht Schafran observes in her discussion of task force reports of gender, racial, and 
ethnic bias in the judicial system, “whatever the problems are for white women and for men of 
color, they are worse and more complex for women of color.”  See Lynn Hecht Schafran, Women 
of Color in the Courts, TRIAL, Aug. 1999, at 21.  For an extended critique of feminist reforms to 
rape law as benefiting white women and leaving black women “more endangered than ever,” see 
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there is nothing in the history to suggest that reformers gave any consideration 
to how rape shield laws might or might not benefit women of color.228  Rather, 
the push for rape shield laws, and indeed rape reform in general, betrays what 
Adrienne Rich refers to as “white solipsism”229—that tendency to see whiteness 
as the norm.230  The same year feminists agitated for rape shield laws, a study of 
rape attitudes of thirty-eight judges in Philadelphia revealed that several judges 
equated the category of “vindictive women” with black women.231  Another 
judge stated, “With the Negro community, you really have to redefine the term 
rape.  You never know about them.”232  It is likely that none of this factored into 
the push for rape shield laws.  The result was rape shield laws that, in hindsight 
at least, are racially contingent in effect. 
Indeed, when one considers expressive message failure, the inadequacy of 
rape shield laws becomes inescapable.  In theory, the effect of rape shield laws 
has been to allow all female rape victims, rather than just a small subset of 
victims, to present themselves as good.  If, as Kimberlé Crenshaw argues, ac-
cusers are pigeonholed into a limited number of categories such as “the whore, 
the tease, the vengeful liar, the mentally or emotionally unstable, or . . . the 
madonna,”233 rape shield laws, by shielding sexual history, in theory allow all 
rape victims to don the guise of the madonna. 
But in reality, the transformation is aspirational at best.  Conceptually, 
and despite the rise in nontraditional casting, it is still difficult to envision a 
black madonna234 (or for that matter an Asian or Hispanic one).  It does not 
comport with our stock types.  The virginal black woman—who in theory should 
  
Erin Edmonds, Mapping the Terrain of Our Resistance: A White Feminist Perspective on the 
Enforcement of Rape Law, 9 HARV. BLACKLETTER J. 43, 47 (1992). 
228. See supra note 79 and accompany text. 
229. ADRIENNE RICH, Disloyal to Civilization: Feminism, Racism, Gynephobia (1978), in ON LIES, 
SECRETS, AND SILENCE: SELECTED PROSE 1966–1978, at 275, 299 (1979). 
230. As one commentator has observed in discussing the rules of evidence in rape cases, “At all levels, 
African American women fare particularly badly, and feminist-inspired reforms have failed to ad-
dress their particular experiences of stereotyping and disqualification.”  Hunter, supra note 4, at 166. 
231. Carol Bohmer, Judicial Attitudes Toward Rape Victims, 57 JUDICATURE 303, 307 (1974). 
232. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
233. See Kimberlé Crenshaw, Whose Story Is It, Anyway?: Feminist and Antiracist Appropriations of 
Anita Hill, in RACE-ING JUSTICE, EN-GENDERING POWER: ESSAYS ON ANITA HILL, 
CLARENCE THOMAS, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY 402, 409 (Toni 
Morrison ed., 1992). 
234. Kimberlé Crenshaw has made a similar point in her analysis of Justice Clarence Thomas’s con-
firmation hearings, which included accusations that he had repeatedly engaged in acts of sexual 
harassment, including against his black employee Anita Hill.  Observed Crenshaw, “For black 
women the issue is not the precariousness of holding on to the protection that the madonna 
image provides . . . . Instead, it is the denial of the presumption of ‘madonna-hood’ that shapes 
responses to black women’s sexual victimization.”  Id. at 414. 
870 60 UCLA L. REV. 826 (2013) 
 
be a deserving victim—is instead assumed to be a Jezebel.235  Finally, the 
continued linkage of black women and concupiscence also explains the need 
many black women have felt to respond to the recent phenomenon of SlutWalks, 
the international grassroots movement “challenging rape culture, victim-blaming 
and slut-shaming.”236  In an open letter from black women to the SlutWalk 
organizers,237 black women expressed solidarity with the organizers’ efforts to 
end the shaming and blaming of sexual assault victims but noted that the luxury 
of self-identifying as a slut is a racialized one. 
As Black women, we do not have the privilege or the space to call 
ourselves “slut” without validating the already historically entrenched 
ideology and recurring messages about what and who the Black wo-
man is.  We don’t have the privilege to play on destructive repre-
sentations burned in our collective minds, on our bodies and souls for 
generations. . . . It is tied to institutionalized ideology about our bod-
ies as sexualized objects of property, as spectacles of sexuality and de-
viant sexual desire.238 
In a way, the response of black women to SlutWalk speaks volumes about 
how rape shield laws likely operate in practice.  A white woman can participate 
in a SlutWalk without losing the presumption of being a good girl when she 
enters the courtroom.  A black woman does not enjoy that presumption because 
the default assumption that likely applies to her is quite different, notwith-
standing rape shield rules.239 
  
235. On the associations of black women stereotypes, see sources cited supra note 201; see also 
MELISSA V. HARRIS-PERRY, SISTER CITIZEN: SHAME, STEREOTYPES, AND BLACK 
WOMEN IN AMERICA (2011). 
236. Frequently Asked Questions, SlutWalk NYC, http://slutwalknyc.tumblr.com/faq (last visited 
Mar. 15, 2013).  For an overview of the phenomenon, see Rebecca Traister, Ladies, We Have a 
Problem, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/24/magazine/clumsy-
young-feminists.html.  For an interesting discussion of using SlutWalks as a means of re-
thinking sexual agency, and in doing so recasting the law of rape, see Deborah Tuerkheimer, 
Slutwalking in the Shadow of the Law (Feb. 22, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at  
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2009541. 
237. An Open Letter From Black Women to the Slutwalk, BLACK WOMEN’S BLUEPRINT (Sept. 23, 2011), 
http://www.blackwomensblueprint.org/2011/09/23/an-open-letter-from-black-women-to-
the-slutwalk. 
238. Id. 
239. Over a decade ago, Regina Austin and Liz Schneider made a similar point about the linkage be-
tween black women and sexual availability and the resulting bind faced by black feminists, who 
as a result tended to “emphasize the restrictive, repressive, and dangerous aspect of sexuality rath-
er than its association with black women’s own pleasure and agency.”  See Regina Austin & 
Elizabeth M. Schneider, Mary Jo Frug’s Postmodern Feminist Legal Manifesto Ten Years Later: 
Reflections on the State of Feminism Today, 36 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1, 21 (2001). 
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But here is the larger issue.  While my focus has been black women vis-à-
vis white women, in fact the expressive message of rape shield laws is likely 
ineffective when it comes to other victims as well: older women, single women, 
overweight women, poor women, working women, unattractive women, gay or 
transgender women, and even male victims.  For example, when confronted with 
an older victim, jurors may fall back on the default stock character of the “dis-
appointed old maid” who secretly wanted sex.240  When confronted with a 
homely woman, jurors may apply a different default assumption, casting her as 
a vindictive, spurned woman.241  In short, rape shield laws might be good for 
cardboard cutout women, ideal women, imaginary women, and women who 
can play the part, but not for the rest of us.  In short, rape shield laws are not 
good for other, real victims of rape. 
IV. RETHINKING RAPE SHIELD LAWS 
In the preceding Parts, I have made the case that rape shield laws should 
trouble us all, focusing in particular on two problems.  The first is the expressive 
message rape shield laws communicate, a message that, on a certain level, rein-
stantiates the very chastity requirement feminists hoped to eradicate.242  The se-
cond problem is the unequal outcomes that result when there is expressive message 
failure: decisionmakers rejecting messages of chastity and relying instead on 
default assumptions about women who, because of race or class or some other 
trait, do not fit the script of ideal rape victims.243  This part, concededly in broad 
strokes, begins the process of sketching a solution. 
A. Two Modest Proposals 
As noted above, one of the expressive messages communicated by rape 
shield laws is that sexual history does matter.  The message to jurors is that they 
should assume the complainant is a virgin, or at least a good girl, and thus 
deserving of the law’s protection.  In other words, rather than subverting the 
  
240. See, e.g., Hans von Hentig, Remarks on the Interaction of Perpetrator and Victim, 31 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIM. BEHAV. 303 (1940). 
241. See Marsha B. Jacobson & Paula M. Popovich, Victim Attractiveness and Perceptions of Responsibility 
in an Ambiguous Rape Case, 8 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 100, 103 (1983) (“[I]f the woman is 
unattractive, she may be less likely to be believed (i.e., ‘Who’d want to rape you?’) and so less likely 
to obtain a conviction against her attacker.”); cf. THOMAS W. MCCAHILL ET AL., THE 
AFTERMATH OF RAPE 116 (1979) (noting that 53.3 percent of rape reports by obese women were 
declined for prosecution, versus a 14.2 percent declination rate for nonobese complainants). 
242. See supra notes 150–166 and accompanying text. 
243. See supra notes 167–240 and accompanying text. 
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common law’s chastity requirement, rape shield laws reify the requirement in 
another form.  This is all the more troubling once one recognizes the role courts 
and jury instructions play in educating the public.  As Justice Brandeis observed 
in a different context, “Our government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher.  
For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example.”244  There is at 
least one way, however, to begin to counter this message, at least in the 
courtroom.  Specifically, courts could provide jurors with an instruction similar 
to the following: 
I give this instruction in all cases because it applies to all rape cases.  
Everyone deserves to have the criminal law vindicate them when they 
have been raped, regardless of their sexual history.  Engaging in sex-
ual behavior, whether it be once or innumerable times, does not ren-
der a person outside of the law’s protection.  Everyone is entitled to 
sexual autonomy, and no one, by merely engaging in sex, assumes the 
risk of subsequent rape.  Put differently, before the law, it does not 
matter whether a complainant is a virgin or sexually active.  Before 
the law, everyone is entitled to legal respect, regardless of his or her 
sexual past.  Accordingly, bear in mind that in this case and in all rape 
cases, all rape victims are entitled to the law’s protection.245 
To be sure, this proposed jury instruction may not completely undo rape law’s 
chastity message.  But if delivered at the start of trial246  and repeated throughout, 
such a jury instruction can make a critical difference in the message jurors are 
  
244. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
245. This instruction borrows heavily from Michelle Anderson’s normative vision of rape law.  See 
Anderson, supra note 5, at 57.  It should be noted that as of 2010, judges in Britain have been en-
couraged to provide jurors instructions to counter biases they may have based on a complainant’s 
manner of dress or other stereotypes about perceived real rape victims.  For example, one sample 
instruction, provided in the Crown Court Bench Book published in 2010, provides the following: 
Illustration—avoiding judgments based on stereotypes: it would be under-
standable if one or more of you came to this trial with assumptions as to what 
constitutes rape, what kind of person may be the victim of rape, what kind of 
person may be a rapist, or what a person who is being, or has been, raped will do 
or say.  It is important that you should leave behind any such assumptions about 
the nature of the offence because experience tells the courts that there is no stereotype 
for rape.  The offence can take place in almost any circumstances between all kinds 
of different people who react in a variety of ways. 
See Lynn Hecht Schafran, Innovative Approaches to Rape Education: New Judicial Instructions in 
the UK and Public Education in Scotland and Australia, SEXUAL ASSAULT REP., Nov./Dec. 
2010, at 23 (quoting the Crown Court Bench Book: Directing the Jury (2010)). 
246. See Neil P. Cohen, The Timing of Jury Instructions, 67 TENN. L. REV. 681 (2000) (citing evi-
dence that instructions given at the beginning of the trial help jurors distinguish relevant 
evidence). 
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left with when they deliberate.247  More importantly for purposes of this Article, 
it can make a difference in the message jurors take with them when they leave the 
courthouse.248 
The second modest proposal addresses expressive message failure, those 
situations in which jurors reject the message communicated by rape shield laws 
and instead rely on default assumptions about sexuality for complainants who 
do not fit the ideal rape victim script.  The key here is that such default assump-
tions are not ineradicable.249  As I have explored elsewhere by building on the 
work of Cynthia Lee,250 one way to override default assumptions or implicit bi-
ases is by encouraging decisionmakers to engage in switching exercises—or 
“imaginative acts of cross gender/race/class/status dressing.”251  In other words, ju-
rors would be encouraged to “cross dress” the complainant.252  For example, 
jurors would ask themselves if they would reach the same conclusion about the 
  
247. Although “[t]he predominant view of scholars, both law professors and psychologists, is that 
evidentiary instructions are exercises in futility,” this view is in fact belied by much evidence.  See 
David Alan Sklansky, Evidentiary Instructions and the Jury as Other, 65 STAN. L. REV. (forthcom-
ing 2013) (manuscript at 4).  Instructions are not perfect; nor are they cure-alls.  But they do 
work under the right conditions, especially when those instructions are coherent and explained.  
Id.  For example, instructions often deter jurors from making arguments during deliberations that 
are directly contrary to the instructions.  See MIRJAN R. DAMAŠKA, EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT 
(1997).  Daniel Capra adds, “The juror in her own mind may disregard an instruction, but she 
would not indicate such a blatant disregard in discussions with other jurors, and so her argu-
ments would be limited by the appropriately admitted evidence.”  Daniel J. Capra, Out-of-Court 
Accusations Offered for “Background”: A Measured Response From the Federal Courts, 55 U. MIAMI 
L. REV. 803, 815–16 (2001). 
248. This accords with de Tocqueville’s assessment of the jury, which he described as “one of the most 
efficacious means for the education of the people which society can employ.”  1 ALEXIS DE 
TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 306 (Henry Reeve trans., D. Appleton & Co. 
1899) (1835); cf. John Leubsdorf, Evidence Law as a System of Incentives, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1621, 
1658–61 (2010) (discussing how evidentiary rules can influence conduct “in the real world”). 
249. For evidence that making individuals aware of their biases facilitates the process of overriding 
them, see Nilanjana Dasgupta, Implicit Ingroup Favoritism, Outgroup Favoritism, and Their Behavioral 
Manifestations, 17 SOC. JUST. RES. 143, 157 (2004).  See also Kang et al., supra note 168, at 
1169–86. 
250. Cynthia Lee introduced the concept of switching exercises to help jurors override inappropriate bi-
ases in self-defense and provocation cases.  See CYNTHIA LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE 
MAN: PASSION AND FEAR IN THE CRIMINAL COURTROOM 203–25 (2003).  My work 
extends the concept to all decisionmakers, such as police, prosecutors, and judges.  It also extends 
the concept to all criminal cases.  See, e.g., Capers, supra note 161 (proposing and exploring the 
benefits of decisionmakers engaging in a switching, or cross-dressing, exercise); Capers, supra note 
150, at 74–76 (discussing benefits to police by reducing racial profiling); Capers, supra note 2, at 
1298–1301 (discussing benefits of cross dressing in prosecuting male victim rape cases); I. Bennett 
Capers, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment: Race, Citizenship, and the Equality Principle, 46 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (2011) (discussing benefits to courts reviewing racial profiling claims). 
251. Capers, supra note 161, at 24. 
252. Again, this could be accomplished through the use of jury instructions.  On the effectiveness of in-
structions to debias jurors, see Sklansky, supra note 247. 
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presence or nonpresence of consent if the complainant were imaginatively “cross 
dressed” as white instead of Latina or as middle-class instead of poor.  Would 
they apply the court’s instruction about all rape victims being entitled to the law’s 
protection, regardless of their sexual history, in the same way?  Jurors reaching 
the same conclusion would know that their decisions are not the product of bias 
or their reliance on default assumptions about complainants who do not fit the 
ideal rape victim script.  By contrast, jurors who reach a different decision would 
be encouraged then to determine for themselves whether their different de-
cision can be justified—for example, whether race, class, or some other differ-
ence should matter in a particular case.  Using such a cross-dressing exercise can 
prompt jurors to acknowledge their own biases and to override those biases to 
apply the rape shield rule equally to all complainants.253 
Neither of these modest proposals completely solves the problem of rape 
shield laws.  But they are a start.  More importantly, they begin a conversation 
about addressing the twin problems of rape shields’ troubling expressive mes-
sage and the harm that occurs when there is expressive message failure. 
B. Beyond Rape Shield Laws 
The final argument I want to make goes beyond rape shield’s problems of 
troubling expressive message and expressive message failure.  The problem of 
rape shield laws—not to mention rape sword laws—is far deeper.  If common 
law evidentiary rules framed trials as pitting bad women against good men, rape 
shield and rape sword rules purport to reframe trials as pitting good women 
against bad men.254  In doing so, rape shield rules have not just tipped the scales.  
They have tipped them too far. 
In short, the broader and admittedly far more difficult argument I want to 
make is that, thirty-five years after Congress enacted Rule 412, it is time, indeed 
past time, to critically reexamine rape shield rules in toto and to determine wheth-
er their advantages in fact outweigh their disadvantages.  The same is true of 
Rule 413 and state rape sword rules.  What is required is an acknowledgement 
that rape shield and rape sword rules were rushed through legislatures with lit-
tle deliberation and with little attention to how such rules would play out in 
  
253. See Capers, supra note 161, at 25.  At least one court has given a similar cross-dressing or switch-
ing instruction.  In a case in Alaska involving a black teenage defendant being tried as an adult 
for striking a white student, the court instructed the jurors to essentially engage in a race-
switching exercise “to test whether stereotypes have affected [their] evaluation of the case.”  
LEE, supra note 250, at 257–58 (discussing the case and quoting the jury instruction). 
254. See supra notes 105–106 and accompanying text. 
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cases beyond those involving the subset of white, middle-class feminists who 
pushed for their passage.255  There also needs to be an acknowledgement and 
discussion of the role both rules play in strengthening the state vis-à-vis the in-
dividual256 and in contributing to what I have elsewhere termed our incarcertory 
state.257  Above all else, what is necessary is an acknowledgment that rape shield 
and rape sword laws were passed without empirical support or any attempt at 
proof.258  Given that we are discussing the rules of evidence, those of us who call 
ourselves feminists or progressives cannot shirk the need for proof. 
It is entirely possible that upon critical examination, we will discover that 
rape shield and rape sword rules do more harm than good.  If nothing else, we 
may find that, notwithstanding their initial merit, they have run their course and 
are no longer necessary.  We may find that we have reached the point at which, 
instead of a prohibition with a finite number of exceptions, what we need is a 
return to basics—an approach in which judges can consider, on a case-by-case 
basis, the probative value of the proffered evidence to the issue sought to be es-
tablished.  The issue in a particular case might be consent, or it might be wheth-
er the defendant was reasonably mistaken as to the existence of consent—an 
issue that was rarely litigated at the time Congress passed Rule 412259 but which 
has come to be the core issue in acquaintance rape cases.  For example, re-
turning relevancy and undue prejudice determinations to judges could result in 
a general consensus that prior sexual history is never relevant in stranger forcible 
rape cases.  By contrast, prior sexual conduct may have some evidentiary value 
in another case, for example, one in which the defendant makes a prima facie 
showing that he reasonably believed consent existed based on his knowledge of 
the complainant’s prior response to sexual advances.260 
Short of placing a moratorium on rape shield rules, there is also Harriet 
Galvin’s proposal.  More than twenty years ago, Galvin proposed modifying the 
rape shield rule so that it would simply bar evidence of sexual history or conduct 
to prove propensity or to support the inference that the accuser is less worthy of 
belief.  Under her proposal, evidence of sexual conduct on the part of the victim 
  
255. See supra notes 79–82 and accompanying text. 
256. See, e.g., Gruber, supra note 72, at 825. 
257. See I. Bennett Capers, Defending Life, in LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE: AMERICA’S NEW DEATH 
PENALTY? 167 (Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & Austin Sarat eds., 2012). 
258. See supra notes 66–70, 142–143 and accompanying text. 
259. Dressler, supra note 72, at 431 (“Before rape law reform, the issue of mens rea rarely arose in rape 
trials.”). 
260. For example, such information was excluded in United States v. Knox, No. ACM 28628, 1992 
WL 97157 (A.F. Ct. Mil. Rev. 1992), aff’d, 41 M.J. 28 (Ct. Mil. App. 1994). 
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could, however, be admissible for other purposes.261  It may be time to reex-
amine her proposal and to examine the empirical evidence supporting or not 
supporting rape shield rules, and to start again.  That is one beauty of the law.  
We may not be able to escape history.  But the law itself—the law can always be 
a tabula rasa. 
One can imagine two counterarguments to this broad proposal: (1) Judges 
will apply antiquated ideas about sexuality to the detriment of women, return-
ing rape cases to their pre-shield days of complainants being victimized twice, 
first by the rapist and then by the trial system; and (2) society is not ready.  
These counterarguments are weighty, but neither should discourage reexam-
ination of rape shield laws.  At the time that feminists pushed legislatures to adopt 
rape shield laws, they were right to express skepticism that a primarily male 
judiciary could fairly judge the relevance and prejudice of prior sexual conduct 
absent strictures in the form of rape shield laws.262  But we have come a long 
way since then.  The federal judiciary is now about 30 percent female.263  Some 
states fare even better.  Recently, women made up eight of thirteen chief justices 
in southern states.264  Across the nation, women held twenty of the chief justice 
positions.265  While much work still needs to be done to obtain gender parity, 
this is not our mothers’ judiciary but rather one that has far more gender parity 
than when Congress enacted rape shields. 
The second counterargument is that society is not ready.  But again, we 
have come a long way.  Rape shield laws were very much a product of their time 
and a response to the stigma that existed then for women engaging in sexual 
activity outside marriage.  Consider the times now and how much has changed.  
When rape shield laws swept the country, society’s attitudes about sex and sex-
uality were a far cry from what they are now.  In 1977, 73 percent of surveyed 
Americans believed that extramarital sex was always wrong, and another 13.6 
percent believed it was almost always wrong.266  We also frowned on premarital 
sex, with 29.3 percent of respondents believing that premarital sex was always 
  
261. Galvin, supra note 14, at 809–10.  For example, under Galvin’s proposal, sexual history evidence 
might be admissible to prove bias or to support a mistake of fact defense. 
262. See Galvin, supra note 14, at 812 n.239; see also BABCOCK ET AL., supra note 138, at 843 (“We are 
. . . loath to leave determinations of general ‘relevancy’ to judges who are too frequently male and 
too frequently imbued with unreal and insensitive attitudes toward women’s sexual attitudes and 
experiences.”). 
263. See Women in the Federal Judiciary: Still a Long Way to Go, NAT’L WOMEN’S L. CTR. (Mar. 1, 2013), 
http://www.nwlc.org/resource/women-federal-judiciary-still-long-way-go-1. 
264. Mark Curriden, Tipping the Scales, 96 A.B.A. J. 37, 37 (2010). 
265. Id. at 38. 
266. Norval D. Glenn & Charles N. Weaver, Attitudes Toward Premarital, Extramarital, and Homosexual 
Relations in the U.S. in the 1970s, 15 J. SEX RES. 108, 113 (1979). 
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wrong, and another 11.7 percent believing that it was almost always wrong.  
Now consider attitudes today.  Premarital sex and cohabitation before or in lieu 
of marriage is now an accepted part of the way we live.267  As Deborah 
Tuerkheimer has recently pointed out, “women’s sexuality and our sense of its 
dimensions have continued to evolve.”268  But even this is an understatement.  
Not only are the overwhelming majority of women (98 percent between the ages 
of twenty-five and forty-four) sexually active.269  They are also becoming sex-
ually active at an earlier age (30 percent of girls between the ages of fourteen 
and seventeen report engaging in vaginal sex,270 and over 50 percent of teenage 
girls between the ages of fifteen and nineteen report vaginal intercourse271).  
And they are engaging in a wider array of sexual practices (for example, of wo-
men between the ages of twenty and forty-nine, most have engaged in oral sex, 
and at least 40 percent report engaging in anal sex).272  Mary Fan makes a 
similar point: We are now a culture in which sex outside relationships or in 
concurrent relationships is the new normal and in which new acronyms to de-
scribe those relationships, such as NSA273 and FWB,274 have entered the gen-
eral lexicon.275 
More importantly, much of the stigma that once attached to sex outside 
marriage is a thing of the past.  Just consider the following: When Prince Charles 
announced his engagement to Princess Diana in 1981, the public demanded 
evidence of her virginity, which her uncle publicly provided.276  There was no 
such demand in 2011 when Prince William married Kate Middleton after the 
two of them had been living together for years.277  As one Brit pithily put it, 
“We live in a modern age and people do all sorts of things before they settle 
  
267. See, e.g., NAOMI CAHN & JUNE CARBONE, RED FAMILIES V. BLUE FAMILIES: LEGAL 
POLARIZATION AND THE CREATION OF CULTURE 33 (2010). 
268. Tuerkheimer, supra note 12, at 1464. 
269. WILLIAM D. MOSHER ET AL., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, SEXUAL 
BEHAVIORS AND SELECTED HEALTH MEASURES: MEN AND WOMEN 15–44 YEARS OF 
AGE, UNITED STATES, 2002, at 51 (2005). 
270. J. Dennis Fortenberry et al., Sexual Behaviors and Condom Use at Last Vaginal Intercourse: A 
National Sample of Adolescents Ages 14 to 17 Years, 7 J. SEXUAL MED. 305, 309–10 (2010). 
271. Id. 
272. See Tuerkheimer, supra note 12, at 1464. 
273. “NSA” is an acronym for “No Strings Attached.” 
274. “FWB” is an acronym for “Friends with Benefits.” 
275. See Mary D. Fan, Sex, Privacy, and Public Health in a Casual Encounters Culture, 45 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 531, 537–43 (2011). 
276. See Gregory Katz, Royal Bride’s Virginity No Longer an Issue for Brits, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 
8, 2011, 9:41 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/04/08/royal-bride-kate-middleton-
virginity_n_846626.html. 
277. Id. 
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down.”278  At the time rape shield laws swept the country, there was public outcry 
when Olivia Newton-John’s pop song “Physical” was played on the radio, with 
several radio stations and the state of Utah banning it.279  Its most risqué lyric 
was “I wanna get physical, let’s go get physical/Let me hear your body talk, your 
body talk.”280  Today, raising hardly an eyebrow, pop star Rihanna sings about 
being excited by “whips and chains”281 and asking her lover, “Come here, rude 
boy, boy; can you get it up?/Come here rude boy, boy; is you big enough?/Take 
it, take it baby, baby/Take it, take it.”282  The prim Mary Tyler Moore of the 
1970s was long ago replaced by women negotiating Sex in the City.  We are at a 
point at which women have made Fifty Shades of Grey, a book about sado-
masochism, one of the best-selling books of 2012;283 at which the release of sex 
tapes by female celebrities such as Paris Hilton and Kim Kardashian seems pas-
sé;284 and at which the only people we seem to frown on for sexting are poli-
ticians.285  A female student at Georgetown Law School can testify before a 
Democratic panel in support of insurance plans that provide contraceptives for 
women, and when conservative talk show host Rush Limbaugh calls her a “slut” 
and a “prostitute,” he is roundly criticized and ostracized by advertisers,286 while 
she receives a call of support from the president.287  And when a candidate for 
  
278. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
279. See Bob Cannon, Olivia Gets Physical, ENT. WKLY., Nov. 19, 1993, http://www.ew.com/ 
ew/article/0,,308706,00.html; see also Soraya Roberts, Olivia Newton-John Tried to Stop ‘Physical’ 
Music Video From Being Released in 1981, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Apr. 20, 2010, 10:28 AM), 
http://www.nydailynews.com/entertainment/music-arts/olivia-newton-john-stop-physical-
music-video-released-1981-article-1.168007. 
280. OLIVIA NEWTON-JOHN, PHYSICAL (MCA Records 1981); see Physical, METROLYRICS, 
http://www.metrolyrics.com/physical-lyrics-olivia-newtonjohn.html (last visited Mar. 15, 
2013). 
281. RIHANNA, S&M (Def Jam Recordings 2010). 
282. RIHANNA, Rude Boy (Def Jam Recordings 2009). 
283. See Julie Bosman, Discreetly Digital, Erotic Novel Sets American Women Abuzz, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
9, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/10/business/media/an-erotic-novel-50-shades-of-
grey-goes-viral-with-women.html; Gabe Habash, The Bestselling Books of 2012, PUBLISHER’S 
WKLY. (Jan. 4, 2013), http://www.publishersweekly.com/pw/by-topic/industry-news/bookselling/ 
article/55383-the-bestselling-books-of-2012.html. 
284. Lola Ogunnaike, Sex, Lawsuits and Celebrities Caught on Tape, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2006, 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C07E6DB1E31F93AA25750C0A9609C8B63. 
285. The Weiner War, ECONOMIST, June 9, 2011, http://www.economist.com/node/18805960; 
Tara Parker-Pope, Digital Flirting—Easy to Do and Easy to Get Caught, N.Y. TIMES WELL 
BLOG (June 13, 2011, 1:47 PM), http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/06/13/digital-flirting-
easy-to-do-and-to-get-caught. 
286. Brian Stelter, Limbaugh Advertisers Flee Show Amid Storm, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2012, http://www. 
nytimes.com/2012/03/05/business/media/limbaugh-advertisers-flee-show-amid-storm.html. 
287. Jonathan Weisman, Obama Backs Student in Furor With Limbaugh on Birth Control, N.Y. TIMES 
CAUCUS BLOG (Mar. 2, 2012, 12:55 PM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/03/02/ 
boehner-condemns-limbaughs-comments. 
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the Senate suggests that “legitimate” rape victims cannot become pregnant from 
rape, his own party asks him to withdraw from the race.288  We have reached the 
point at which men, especially younger men, get it: “No” really means “no.”289  
And quite possibly we have reached the point at which most jurors can consider 
prior sexual history for its probative value without the risk of unfair prejudice. 
Still, I can imagine the hesitation about “taking a break”290 from rape shield 
laws.291  While collectively we have come a long way, there are still those out 
there who will view a complainant’s sexual history as proof positive of consent in 
perpetuity.  While that is true, so is this: Rape shields are an increasingly im-
perfect solution.  Maybe tomorrow is too soon to put a moratorium on rape 
shield laws.  But it is not too soon to reexamine them and begin thinking ahead. 
CONCLUSION 
For a while, it appeared as if the improbable would happen.  On May 14, 
2011, shortly before he was about to board a plane to France, Dominique Strauss-
Kahn was arrested and charged with forcibly raping a maid at the New York 
hotel where he had stayed.292  This was improbable because Strauss-Kahn, as 
managing director of the International Monetary Fund and leading contender 
to replace French President Nicolas Sarkozy, was a man of incredible wealth and 
power.  It was improbable because his accuser, Nafissatou Diallo, was a heavy-
set, immigrant woman from Guinea, and as a hotel maid she was decidedly un-
derclass.  He was white.  She was black. 
  
288. John Eligon & Michael Schwirtz, Senate Candidate Provokes Ire With ‘Legitimate Rape’ Comment, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/20/us/politics/todd-akin-provokes- 
ire-with-legitimate-rape-comment.html; Jonathan Weisman & John Eligon, G.O.P. Trying to 
Oust Akin From Race for Rape Remarks, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2012/08/21/us/politics/republicans-decry-todd-akins-rape-remarks.html. 
289. Cf. Kahan, supra note 167, at 777. 
290. This is a play on Janet Halley’s manifesto.  See JANET HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS: HOW AND 
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It was not improbable because such rapes do not happen.  Indeed, there is 
a long history of masters raping their servants, even temporary servants.293  
Rather, it was improbable because such rapes are rarely prosecuted.294  Notwith-
standing the fact that this too was a familiar rape script, such rapes were also 
nonrapes.  The servant knew that if she complained she could be quietly dis-
missed with little or no recourse.  She knew that in the battle of “she said, he 
said,” her word was less likely to be credited than his.  After all, he was a man of 
means with some position in society.  He could have anyone.  Why would he 
rape her?  And she knew that if she complained, they would say it was money—
she was just after money. 
All these dynamics played out in the Dominique Strauss-Kahn case, and 
in August 2011, the district attorney for Manhattan did something that was 
similarly improbable (simply because in numbers it happens so rarely) and yet 
not unexpected: He dismissed the charges against Strauss-Kahn.295  Of course, 
there were other dynamics at play.  Strauss-Kahn, relying on his wealth, had 
assembled a team of high-powered lawyers and investigators.296  The housekeep-
er admitted that she had made false statements to the district attorney’s office, 
including the lie that she had been gang raped in her home country.297  And she 
had suggested, in a conversation with a friend that happened to be recorded, that 
her claim against Strauss-Kahn would be resolved with money.298  In short, as a 
rape claimant, she came with baggage.  At the end, it mattered little that she had 
bruises on her body,299 or that the results of the prompt medical examination 
provided unambiguous evidence of a sexual encounter,300 or that there was evi-
dence that Strauss-Kahn had engaged in similar conduct before.301 
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We will likely never know what happened between Strauss-Kahn and his 
accuser.  She still maintains that she was raped.302  And interestingly, the dis-
trict attorney has never disagreed.  Rather, the basis for dismissing was his be-
lief that he could not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she was raped.303  
And while I have no doubt that his conclusion was a rational one,304 I also won-
der if he reached his conclusion after realizing how difficult it would be to tell a 
stock story about the case that would resonate with jurors.  While the gov-
ernment could invoke the master–servant rape script, such scripts rarely involve 
prosecution, let alone guilty verdicts.  I wonder too if he worried about the ef-
ficacy of the rape shield.  Because her prior false rape allegation did not involve 
sexual conduct, it would likely not be barred by New York’s rape shield305 and 
instead would be admissible as prior conduct probative of truthfulness or 
untruthfulness.306 
But beyond that, what would the jurors think of her prior sexual history?  
Even with a rape shield, jurors would see a heavy-set black woman before them 
claiming that she was raped.  Even with a rape shield, jurors might rely on 
default assumptions to assume that as a black woman, she was likely sexually ac-
tive and less discriminating in her choice of partners.  Because she was an 
immigrant, they might even assume that sex is more casual in her culture.  
Because she was heavy set and plain, they might assume that she would wel-
come Strauss-Kahn’s advances.  In any event, she certainly would not fit their 
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image of an ideal rape victim.  She was not petite or feminine.  She was not white.  
She did not look like a good girl. 
Part of my solution to the problem of rape shield laws—my modest pro-
posals of instructing jurors that all rape victims, whatever their sexual history, 
are entitled to the protection of the law, and of encouraging jurors to engage in 
cross-dressing exercises—mitigates this problem somewhat.  But maybe the not-
so-modest proposal I make about rethinking rape shield laws entirely is the real 
solution.  I do not profess to have an answer.  The goal of this Article has been 
to begin a conversation about rape shield laws, not to end one.  What I do know 
is that rape shield laws are only part of the problem.  Rape shield laws or not, 
decisionmakers who matter—police officers, prosecutors, jurors, judges, and 
even rapists and rape victims—have preconceptions about what constitutes real 
rape, what real rapists look like, and what real victims look like.  Rape shield 
laws or not, decisionmakers still look at cases and wonder why the victim did 
not fight back more or why there was not more vaginal bruising if she did not 
want it.  They will still look at cases and wonder why it does not fit their rape 
script.  I have said that we cannot escape history.  But neither can we escape our 
own expectations, including our expectations about what real rape looks like. 
Perhaps the real task is not one of law or of gentle nudges307 but of chang-
ing the culture.  Whatever it is, we need to do something.  This Article, hopeful-
ly, makes a start. 
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